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OVERLAY ZONING, PERFORMANCE STANDARDS, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AFTER 
NOLLAN 
Robert J. Blackwell* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For well over half a century, local governments have been empow-
ered to regulate land use within their boundaries. l In 1926, the 
United States Supreme Court, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty,2 upheld 
the right of municipalities to divide land into various use districts, 
based on the broad police power of protecting the health, safety, 
welfare, and morals of the pUblic. 3 Euclidean zoning, however, is 
ineffective in its protection of environmentally sensitive lands be-
cause it focuses on social and economic values rather than on natural 
resources. 4 In addition, Euclidean zoning is often too inflexible to 
accommodate the irregular boundaries of environmentally sensitive 
areas. 5 Other land use controls, including the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act ("NEPA"),6 purchasing and condemnation, donation 
and dedication, nuisance law, and protective covenants also suffer 
from one or more deficiencies that render them inadequate in pro-
tecting environmental areas. 7 
* Topics Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Fulton, A New Era for Private Property Rights, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Nov. 1987, 
at 28 [hereinafter CALIFORNIA LAWYER]. 
2272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
3Id. at 391-92, 397. 
4 See Palmer, Environmentally Based Land Use Regulations, 2 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 
26-27 (1984). 
5 See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inflexibility of Euclid-
ean zoning. 
642 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). 
7 See infra notes 46-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the deficiencies of these 
land use controls. 
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In contrast, overlay zoning more effectively protects natural re-
source areas. Overlay zones are those that are specifically tailored 
to protect the environmental area at issue, whether it be a reservoir, 
aquifer, forest, or beach area. 8 An outgrowth of Euclidean zoning, 
overlay zones in effect circumscribe an environmental area that is 
already subject to Euclidean regulation, and impose additional re-
quirements thereon. 9 Overlay zones are more effective than other 
land use controls in environmental protection because of their flexi-
bility, their concentrated focus on specific environmental areas, and 
their use of performance standards. 10 
Performance standards are criteria established to control and min-
imize offensive by-products of land uses, such as noise, odor, pollu-
tants, and runoff. 11 There are two types of performance standards: 
primitive and precision. 12 Precision standards, for purposes of this 
Comment, are defined as those that contain both a scientifically 
developed means of measurement and a scientifically known and 
accepted level of performance. 13 For example, an agency such as the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency may scientifically 
develop maximum pollutant discharge levels for an industry that 
may be subsequently adopted by a local community in its zoning 
ordinance. 14 
Primitive standards are more general than precision standards, 
and include standards based on nuisance law as well as those with 
some quantifiable standards that do not meet both scientific criteria 
for precision standards. 15 A primitive standard, for example, is one 
that prohibits land uses that produce an "objectional level of emis-
8 See infra notes 138-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmental overlay 
zones. 
9 See D. CALLIES & R. FREILICH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 80 (1986) [here-
inafter CALLIES & FREILICH]. 
10 See infra notes 149-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effectiveness of 
overlay zoning. 
11 3 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (2D) § 16.11, at 67 (1977). 
12 Gillespie, Industrial Zoning and Beyond: Compatibility Through Performance Stan-
dards, 46 J. URB. L. 723, 751 (1969). 
13 McDougal, Performance Standards: A Viable Alternative to Euclidean Zoning?, 47 TUL. 
L. REV. 255, 270 (1973). 
14 See Thurow, Toner & Erley, Performance Controls for Sensitive Lands, AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE, INFORMATION REPORT 
Nos. 307, 308, at 95 (1975) [hereinafter INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308]. 
15 Cf. 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (3D) § 9.45, at 240-42 (1986) [hereinafter 
ANDERSON (3D)] (noting performance standards grounded on "levels of tolerance"); see also 
McDougal, supra note 13, at 270 (citing commentators who define precision standards as those 
that contain both scientific criteria). 
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sions."16 Another example of a primitive standard is a hillside per-
formance standard for erosion control.17 These standards are not 
scientifically substantiated, but are based on expert studies. 18. 
Courts have upheld both primitive and precision standards as valid 
exercises of the police power.19 Primitive standards, however, be-
cause of their less substantiated bases, do not afford ideal protection 
against possible arbitrariness in government regulation. 20 Because 
they may be couched in general nuisance language or may not meet 
both scientific criteria, primitive standards are more likely to be 
subject to broad interpretation by local governments, and hence, to 
be arbitrarily interpreted. 21 
Currently, the validity of primitive standards is questionable. Re-
cent United States Supreme Court decisions may signify a trend 
toward judicial curtailment of the broad discretion afforded local 
governments under the police power. Specifically, in Nollan v. Cal-
ifornia Coastal Commission,22 the Court stated that land use reg-
ulation must "substantially advance" the government's interest in 
that area,23 and that there must be an adequate "nexus" between 
the regulation and the state land use objective. 24 Thus, it is arguable 
that because primitive standards are not as narrowly drawn as pre-
cision standards, and are therefore more likely to be subject to 
arbitrary enforcement by local governments, they do not advance 
the government's interest as "substantially," nor do they have as 
close a "nexus" to such interests, as do precision standards. Conse-
quently, the imposition of primitive standards under N ollan may be 
deemed an unconstitutional taking of land. Overlay zones that con-
tain primitive standards may also, in turn, be invalidated. The elim-
ination of these zones will effectively eliminate a key protection of 
environmentally sensitive lands. 
This Comment presents an overview of many land use devices, 
including overlay zoning and performance standards, their respec-
16 Cj. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Anderson, 74 So. 2d 544, 545 (Fla. 1954). This ordinance 
contains primitive standards because its language is couched in terms of nuisance law. See 
infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the characteristics of primitive 
standards. 
17 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 97. 
18Id. 
19 See generally Gillespie, supra note 12, at 751 (discussing various aspects of primitive 
performance standards and noting their validity). 
20 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 270-71. 
21 See id. 
22 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
23 Id. at 3146, 3148. 
24 Id. at 3148. 
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tive capacities for environmental protection, and a discussion of the 
possible effects of N ollan on primitive standards. Section II dis-
cusses the ineffectiveness of most land use regulations in protecting 
the environment. Section III discusses the use of overlay zoning in 
affording relatively greater environmental protection. In Section IV, 
this Comment focuses on a crucial component of environmental ov-
erlay zones-performance standards-and discusses the validity of 
both primitive and precision standards. Section V discusses N ollan 
and advances four arguments why, after Nollan, primitive standards 
should remain a valid and viable land use control. This Comment 
concludes that, in conjunction with overlay zoning, primitive stan-
dards substantially protect environmentally sensitive lands. Such 
zones, already in use in several jurisdictions, offer the best environ-
mental protection possible. 25 
II. THE FAILURE OF CURRENT LAND USE REGULATION 
TECHNIQUES TO PROTECT ENVIRONMENTALLY SENSITIVE AREAS 
A. Euclidean Zoning 
Euclidean zoning, the traditional land use development and reg-
ulation technique used in the United States, derives its name from 
the landmark United States Supreme Court case Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty.26 In Euclid, an owner of vacant land brought suit against 
the village for enacting a comprehensive zoning ordinance that clas-
sified the owner's land as residential. 27 The owner claimed that such 
a classification reduced the value of his property and was an uncon-
stitutional restriction of its use. 28 The Court disagreed, and its opin-
ion supporting zoning as a valid police power function set the stage 
for nationwide proliferation of zoning ordinances. 29 
Currently, within municipalities and counties, Euclidean zones are 
fixed by legislative action. 30 These zones specify the uses that are 
allowed on parcels of land within each zone. They also provide bulk 
25 See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text for examples of proposed or existing 
environmental overlay zones that utilize performance standards. 
2S 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
27 I d. at 384. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 394-97. 
30 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 1-17 (West 1979) (empowers local govern-
ments to divide and maintain land in various use districts). 
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requirements for parcels, that is, size, area, shape, density, setback, 
and other requirements. 31 
Although Euclidean zoning has been upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court as a means to protect the health, safety, welfare, 
and morals of the public,32 it has nonetheless been inadequate to 
protect environmentally sensitive lands. 33 By focusing primarily on 
protecting economic and social values, Euclidean zoning addresses 
the immediate use of land within the municipality, but ignores the 
cumulative effect of all the permitted uses of the land upon the 
environment. 34 For example, in Rhode Island, concerned citizens 
and environmentalists complain that current zoning regulations do 
not address long-term projections regarding development in wa-
tershed areas. 35 
31 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 37. 
32 272 U.S. 365, 396 (1926) (''[An] ordinance can be declared unconstitutional [if] its provi-
sions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare."). Two years later, the Court limited the states' 
broad regulatory power by holding that an otherwise valid zoning ordinance may be uncon-
stitutional as applied to a specific parcel. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 189 
(1928). 
There seems to be no limit as to what may be included in the police power. Today, "general 
welfare" encompasses a "wider range of issues [that have] been brought into zoning-including 
esthetics, historic values, low-income housing and the need to increase opportunities for 
minority populations. Zoning is stretched to protect social, fiscal, and environmental goals 
that were not traditionally its goals. As the theory of the public interest expands, zoning 
expands." LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AN 
ANALYSIS OF ZONING REFORMS: MINIMIZING INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION, 11 (1979) [here-
inafter ZONING REFORMS]. 
33 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 26-27. "Environmentally sensitive lands" are those "whose 
destruction or disturbance will immediately effect [sic] the life of a community by either (1) 
creating hazards such as flooding or landslides, or (2) destroying important public resources 
such as water supplies and the water quality of lakes and rivers, or (3) wasting important 
productive lands and renewable resources." INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 
14, at 34. 
Typically, courts have upheld environmentally-based zoning ordinances as a proper power 
action. See Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 314-15, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 
97 (1972) (flood plain ordinance); Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 146 Conn. 650, 655-
56, 153 A.2d 822, 824 (1959) (riverbank protection ordinance); Golden v. Board of Selectmen 
of Falmouth, 358 Mass. 519, 522-23, 265 N.E.2d 573, 575 (1970) (marsh protection ordinance); 
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10-11,201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1972) (shoreland zoning 
ordinance). But see Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 
40 N.J. 539, 557, 193 A.2d 232, 242 (1963) (swampland ordinance invalidated as "clearly far 
too restrictive and ... confiscatory" where ordinance effectively left parcel useless). 
34 See Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany, 70 N. Y.2d 193, 206, 512 N.E.2d 526, 531, 
518 N. Y.S.2d 943, 948 (1987) (rezoning of environmental area held invalid because town did 
not consider cumulative impact of development on the area); see also Palmer, supra note 4, 
at 26-27. Euclidean zoning tends to focus on protecting social and economic values and not 
the environment. See id. 
35 New England Sierran, May 1987, at 1, col. 1. According to David Goleliewski, chief 
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Zoning also fails to protect environmentally sensitive land because 
zoning is specifically addressed to the needs of a single community, 
while the effects of such zoning are felt outside that community.36 In 
many instances, environmentally sensitive areas that are located 
adjacent to towns are indirectly affected by a town's zoning ordi-
nances. 37 Even though a development is in full compliance with the 
town's zoning laws, it might, for example, increase the amount of 
drainage and runoff flowing into catch basins and flood areas outside 
its boundaries and thus affect land outside the town. 38 Such devel-
opment might also increase traffic on roadways through natural 
resource areas in surrounding municipaliti~s. 39 
Euclidean zoning also fails to protect reservoirs and aquifers be-
cause towns usually get their water from outside their boundaries. 
Thus, the receiving town's zoning laws will not ensure the quality 
of the water it receives from the reservoir or aquifer of a neighboring 
town. 40 In addition, because environmentally sensitive areas, such 
as forests41 or water bodies, may transcend the boundaries of several 
municipalities, zoning designed to regulate land use in a single com-
munity will not effectively protect the entire area of environmental 
concern. 42 
engineer of the Pawtucket, Rhode Island, Water Supply Board, '''[wlhile the existing regu-
lations determine the short term capability of waste filtration by the soil, they fail to address 
the potential cumulative effects from the ongoing over-development of sensitive land areas 
adjacent to our water supply.''' [d. at col. 2. 
36 See Fredland, Environmental Performance Zoning: An Emerging Trend?, 12 URB. LAW. 
678, 679 (1980) [hereinafter Fredlandl. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
39 See id. 
40 New England Sierran, supra note 35, at 1, col. 4. For example, on Cape Cod, Massachu-
setts, all of the Cape's fifteen towns share a single aquifer. See Palmer, supra note 4, at 54-
56. Because population and development explosions as well as gasoline contamination threat-
ened the integrity of this sole source of drinking water for the Cape, the Cape Cod Planning 
and Economic Development Commission proposed a model ordinance, a type of overlay zone, 
to protect the aquifer. [d. The fifteen towns have virtually ignored the model and have 
continued enforcing their existing zoning ordinances, resulting in continued degradation of 
the aquifer. [d. 
41 See, e.g., Boston Globe, Feb. 7, 1988, (Magazine), at 21 (discussion of unique tropical rain 
forests in Hawaii). 
42 See, e.g., INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 3 (citing example of 
San Jacinto area of Texas in which ineffective land use regulations allowed industries to pump 
out excessive water from aquifer causing the subsidence of land in surrounding residential 
communities which sat atop same aquifer); see also State Resources Known to be Affected by 
Activities Beyond Zone, Panetta Says, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1446 (Oct. 2, 1987) ("Activities 
outside of state coastal waters affect air and other resources in the coastal zone .... "); Save 
a Valuable Environment (SAVE) v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash. 2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978) 
(court invalidated city's rezoning of farmland for construction of shopping mall because the 
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The environment also suffers due to Euclidean zoning because 
there is no financial incentive for developers to actively seek to 
protect the environment. 43 Developers are often interested in max-
imizing profits, and they will generally build to the maximum level 
permitted by local ordinances. 44 Because there are no provisions in 
traditional Euclidean zoning to discourage development to the max-
imum level allowable, the pursuit of maximum profits causes envi-
ronmental damage that affects the ecological, health, and aesthetic 
benefits of natural resources. 45 
B. The National Environmental Policy Act 
In addition to the failure of Euclidean zoning to properly protect 
environmentally sensitive lands, the National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969 ("NEPA")46 is also ill-equipped to adequately protect the 
environment from poorly controlled land use decisions. 47 NEP A pro-
vides that any federal action taken that will have an adverse impact 
on the environment should only continue if proper steps are taken 
to safeguard the environment and maintain its preservation. 48 
NEPA requires that all federal agencies proposing a major devel-
opment plan prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") 
describing the anticipated effects of the proposed development on 
the environment. 49 An agency must also demonstrate in the EIS that 
new mall would cause severe environmental harm outside of city, and city had duty to consider 
effects outside of its jurisdiction). 
43 See INFORMATION REPORT, Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 3 ("[T]he real estate market 
does not adequately consider these costs and benefit of protecting [environmental re-
sources]."). For example, the benefit that one receives from keeping a wetland on one's 
property (naturally occurring filtering mechanism for upland runoff) is public in nature, and 
will probably be outweighed by the profits one can receive by draining and filling the wetland 
so as to have more land to develop. See id. 
44 New England Sierran, supra note 35, at 1, col. 4. 
45 Palmer, supra note 4, at 27. 
46 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982). NEPA was signed into law on Jan. 1, 1970. 
47 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 27-29; see also W. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING 
LAWS: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ApPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 223-24 (1985). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1982) 
[d. 
. . . [Ilt is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with 
State and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, 
to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, 
in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and 
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, 
and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future gen-
erations of Americans. 
49 [d. at § 4332(2)(C). All federal government agencies shall 
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action to be taken by the proponents will include mitigation of the 
project's adverse environmental impact. 50 
Although NEPA's scope is limited to actions taken by federal 
agencies,51 many states have adopted measures similar to NEPA to 
regulate local developments, proposed by either governmental or 
private developers, that affect the natural environment. 52 An EIS is 
generally required from the developer, although some states require 
the EIS from the governmental agency that is ultimately responsible 
for granting the permit for the project. 53 
Despite the good intentions of Congress and the state and local 
governments in requiring the EIS, it is not a useful tool for pro-
tecting the environment for several reasons. On the federal level, 
there are no exacting standards for the contents of an EIS.54 The 
result is that the agency proposing the project is the same agency 
drafting the EIS.55 Thus, there is no incentive for the agency pre-
paring the EIS, which merely wants to see its project approved 
quickly, to be objective in its findings, and thereby to adequately 
consider potential environmental harm. 56 
[d. 
... include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other 
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, 
a detailed statement by the responsible official on -
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, 
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal 
be implemented, 
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action, 
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the 
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and 
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be 
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 
50 [d. at § 4332 (2)(G), (H). 
51 See Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 
1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (NEPA's impact statement requirements held to apply where a 
federal agency, even through third parties, takes action that affects the environment). 
52 See J. PETULLA, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (1987). 
53 Palmer, supra note 4, at 30--31. 
54 [d. at 29. An EIS is required only where the proposed development will "significantly 
affect the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). Case law inter-
preting NEPA provides similarly vague standards. For example, NEPA "requires a balancing 
between environmental costs and economic and technical benefits." Cape May Greene, Inc. v. 
Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 188 (3d Cir. 1983). Further, an agency need not, "in selecting a course 
of action, ... elevate environmental concerns over other appropriate considerations." Stryck-
er's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (per curiam). 
55 See W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at :::23-24. 
56 See id. at 224; see also J. PETULLA, supra note 52, at 103. 
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NEPA's EIS process is also faulty in that the review process for 
a federal agency's EIS is practically non-existent at both the admin-
istrative and judicial levels. 57 Thus, there is usually no check on an 
agency's discretion. 58 Another criticism of NEPA is that disagree-
ments often arise among scientists about the environmental ramifi-
cations of a proposed project.59 The lack of definite standards for an 
EIS threatens its credibility and utility because it is often difficult 
to reach a consensus on possible environmental ramifications. 60 
Political, procedural, and bureaucratic problems plague the EIS 
process.6! 
The local EIS process is subject to the same criticism as its federal 
counterpart. State NEP A policies also lack significant statutory 
guidance to delineate proper and specific guidelines for an EIS.62 In 
addition, state NEPA policies, especially those dealing with projects 
at the local level, demonstrate less expertise on environmental mat-
ters than federal policies. 63 EIS administration is also an expensive, 
drawn-out process that provides only questionable benefits to the 
environment. 64 It is clear that NEP A and its state and local coun-
terparts, with their inherently weak EIS programs, are ineffective 
at minimizing environmental impact from proposed development. 65 
57 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 29. 
58 See id. 
59Id. (quoting Speth, The Federal Role in Technology Assessment and Control, FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 420,452-53 (E. Doglin & T. Guilbert, eds. 1974)). 
60 See J. PETULLA, supra note 52, at 100. 
61 See id. at 94-106. 
62 Palmer, supra note 4, at 32. 
63 See, e.g., Kaledin, The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act and Private Develop-
ment Activity: Is the Law Working?, 32 BOSTON B. J. 23-27 (Jan.lFeb. 1988) (generally 
critiquing MEPA as inefficient at protecting environmental lands and noting in particular that 
MEPA is ineffective at slowing private growth that ravages the land); see also Save the Pine 
Bush v. City of Albany, 70 N.Y.2d 193, 206, 512 N.E.2d 526, 531, 518 N.Y.S.2d 943, 948 
(1987) (state environmental board mistakenly approved rezoning of rare inland pine barrens 
without considering the cumulative impact of development in the area). 
Further, the state EIS process affords a broad opportunity for citizen challenge to an EIS. 
See W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 224. Such challenges open developers up to attacks from 
interest groups, which may cause them to delay and perhaps ultimately abandon their projects. 
See id. While this result may be desirable to eliminate environmentally damaging projects, it 
nevertheless shows a failure of NEPA to implement an objective standard for the contents of 
an EIS. See id. 
64 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 31. 
65 See W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 223-24. The author recommends reform of NEPA. 
Id. The Planning Advisory Service, moreover, recommends, for example, that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency offer more assistance and education to local governments in imple-
menting programs under § 208 of the Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972. See 
INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 2. 
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C. Outright Purchasing and Condemnation 
Although Euclidean zoning and NEPA fail to adequately address 
concerns regarding the effects of development on environmentally 
sensitive lands, there are other methods at the local level that may 
help to preserve the environment. For example, if a particular piece 
of land in or adjacent to an environmentally sensitive area becomes 
available, a local government may purchase the land outright. 66 Suf-
folk County, New York, for instance, purchased 24,000 acres of 
pinelands for $157 million to protect the groundwater beneath the 
pines from contamination.67 Local governments may also pool their 
efforts in such purchases. For example, Massachusetts towns banded 
under an organization called the "Bay Circuit" and working closely 
with the state's Department of Environmental Management, have 
been purchasing parcels of open land to create a 100 mile long 
greenbelt around metropolitan Boston. 68 
There is no guarantee, however, that such lands will be available 
for purchase. For example, an impasse may be reached with the 
sellers of such land regarding purchase price, or a crucial piece of 
land may not be placed on the market. A local government may then 
wish to use its power of condemnation to purchase such land. 69 
Although the local government cannot invoke its condemnation 
power without a proper public purpose,70 courts define "public pur-
pose" very broadly, and thus make condemnation a viable option. 71 
Condemnation may be used, for example, to justify the local gov-
ernment's forced sale of property to protect a conservation area. 72 
66 See Livingston, Open Space Preservation, 56 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 753, 772--76 (1980). 
67 Long Island Aquifer Would Be Protected Under Suffolk County Land Acquisition Plan, 
18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 451 (May 22, 1987) (the acquisition will prevent harmful development 
atop the area's sole drinking water source). 
68 See Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1988, at 26, col. 3. Exorbitant real estate prices have similarly 
encouraged a coalition of California environmental groups to get a $770 million bond issue on 
the ballot to help localities purchase and protect natural resource areas. See CALIFORNIA 
LAWYER, supra note 1, at 31. 
69 See CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 9, at 641 (condemnation is the government's exercise 
of its eminent domain powers, which is the taking of private property with just compensation 
for a proper public purpose). 
70 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
71 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) ("Subject to specific constitutionallimita-
tions, where the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the 
public needs .... ") (emphasis added); see also CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 9, at 647 
(police power has been expanded to include growth management, aesthetics, rural and agri-
cultural preservation, environmental protection, and transferable development rights). 
72 See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Welcker, 65 Wash. 2d 677,399 P.2d 330 (1965) (upheld right 
1989] OVERLAY ZONING 625 
As long as there is some substance to the town's claim that the 
conservation area needs to be protected from development, the ac-
tion will likely be held valid. 73 
When a local government purchases land through condemnation, 
however, it must pay for the highest and best use possible for the 
land-that is, the most economically profitable, yet reasonable, use 
of the land. 74 Given the tremendous rise in real estate prices in recent 
years, local governments faced with limited budgets cannot purchase 
every environmentally sensitive parcel through condemnation pro-
ceedings. 75 In addition, local governments may decide against utiliz-
ing formal condemnation proceedings because they are lengthy and 
politically unpopular. 76 
D. Donation and Dedication 
Another way that local governments can attempt to preserve 
natural resource areas is to rely on private citizens to donate such 
property.77 The donors receive sufficient tax benefits through real 
estate and charitable donation deductions for their gifts of land78 and 
thus have a strong incentive to donate. 79 Donation is, however, an 
unreliable method for local governments to use to protect the envi-
ronment. Landowners might be hesitant to donate, even if they have 
a desire to help preserve the environment, because they are unaware 
of the tax benefits received from such donation.80 They might also 
be unaware that the donated land can be maintained for the benefit 
of the environment, as the donor so intended, through the use of 
reversionary deeds and donation to reliable entities, such as conser-
vation groups. 81 
of municipality to use its condemnation power to purchase 1450 acres of riverfront property 
to protect its water supply from pollution). 
73 See, e.g., Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 351 Ill. 48, 
51, 183 N.E. 819, 820 (1932) (condemnation upheld to preserve area surrounding forest 
preserve). 
74 See Livingston, supra note 66, at 777. 
75 New England Sierran, supra note 35, at 1, col. 3. 
76 See Livingston, supra note 66. 
77 See id. at 778-81. 
78 See Boston Globe, Jan. 20, 1988, at 26, col. 5. Benefits to grantors of "easements or gifts 
[of land] can be a 95 percent reduction in property taxes. In addition, there is a federal gift 
tax deduction, and inheritance taxes are reduced by the amount of the easement or gift". Id. 
79 Livingston, supra note 66, at 779-80. 
80 Id. at 780. 
81 Id. For example, the Trustees of Reservations is a non-profit organization that is dedicated 
to acquiring and preserving, through the use of a trust, properties of exceptional scenic, 
historic, and ecological value. The Trustees of Reservations owns over seventy properties 
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Dedication of environmentally sensitive lands to the public is an-
other possible local-levelland use control and is similar to a donation 
in that it involves giving land to the public.82 It differs, though, in 
that landowners do not give land on a voluntary basis, but rather 
are required to do so by either statute or common law principles83 
whenever they attempt to subdivide land. 84 Assuming the local gov-
ernmental entity is receiving such land in order to protect legitimate 
state objectives under the police power, the dedication requirement 
is legitimate.85 In addition, as with donations, the dedicators, or 
subdividers, receive a benefit from the dedication in that they are 
no longer liable for the upkeep or taxes on the dedicated land. 86 
Dedication is not always a viable option in every jurisdiction be-
cause some local governments require a stronger nexus than a gen-
eral public safety and welfare test to authorize a dedication. 87 Ded-
ication in these jurisdictions is allowed only if the need created for 
the land is "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the subdivision 
in question. 88 
Most environmental harm caused by the inadequacies of Euclidean 
zoning is attributable to the culmination of effects from a variety of 
developments over a period of time rather than from a single devel-
oper.89 Thus, courts are not likely to uphold dedication in "uniquely 
totalling more than 17,500 acres, all of them open to the public. See THE TRUSTEES OF 
RESERVATIONS, (CONSERVING THE MASSACHUSETTS LANDSCAPE), 1986 ANNUAL REPORT 1 
(1987). 
82 Livingston, supra note 66, at 781. 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31,207 P.2d 1 (1949) 
(upheld city council's requirement that subdivider dedicate portion of land for traffic safety 
purposes). 
85 Id. at 34, 207 P.2d at 3 (required dedication of land to prevent a traffic hazard that would 
result if development were allowed as planned on a small triangular piece of land surrounded 
by major thoroughfares). 
86 See Livingston, supra note 66, at 783. Landowners, however, are still liable for the 
taxation and upkeep of the land (because they retain fee simple title) if the dedication is 
merely a common law implied easement of public access. I d. 
87 See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 382, 
176 N.E.2d 799,801 (1961) (court struck down dedication requirement of6.7 acres ofland for 
use as elementary school when subdivision plan showed only 250 residential units planned); 
R.G. Dunbar Inc. v. Toledo Plan Comm'n, 52 Ohio App. 2d 45, 52, 367 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 
(1976) (city could not require dedication of right-of-way for major highway that was not 
attributable to plaintiff's subdivision but rather was for public's general benefit); Frank 
Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 74, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (1970) (small size of 
subdivision did not merit dedication of "at least 7%" of subdivision's land to city for use as 
recreation area). 
88 See Pioneer Trust, 22 Ill. 2d at 381, 176 N.E.2d at 802. 
89 See New England Sierran, supra note 35, at 1, col. 2. 
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attributable" jurisdictions if the environmental harm sought to be 
prevented is not solely attributable to a particular parcel. 90 For 
example, an aquifer may run beneath several communities each 
containing countless parcels of land which mayor may not discharge 
into the aquifer. Because of the uncertain flow of groundwater, no 
one can be certain from where the pollutants will come. 91 In such 
areas, a "uniquely attributable" dedication cannot be required from 
landowners. Thus, dedication is not a universally effective protector 
of natural resource areas because jurisdictions vary in their thresh-
olds for when they will require dedication, leaving some natural 
areas unprotected. 
Moreover, dedication, like donation, is ineffective at environmen-
tal protection because it requires that local governments wait pas-
sively for private real estate transactions to occur before they can 
engage in such protection. 92 A passive stance affords minimal envi-
ronmental protection because the real estate market does not oper-
ate to preserve the environment. 93 
E. Nuisance Law 
Another method a local government may rely on to address en-
vironmental needs is nuisance law. 94 A branch of tort law, nuisance 
law operates under the general principle that landowners may use 
their property in any way desired, so long as they do not injure 
others.95 Although nuisance law predates zoning as a land use con-
trol, 
. . . it is not a land use control in the modern sense. A nuisance 
is defined as a specific activity and it must be shown to exist and 
actually cause some harm before a court will hear the case. It 
becomes a land use control only as a result of the effects of 
90 Pioneer Trust, 22 Ill. 2d at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802-03. 
91 See generally Davis, Groundwater Pollution: Case Law Theories for Relief, 39 Mo. L. 
REV. 117 (1974). 
92 Cf. INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 3-4 (active government 
involvement, not waiting for private real estate transactions, is necessary to afford proper 
environmental protection). 
93 See id. 
94 See W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 27. The word "nuisance" is generally undefinable and 
encompasses such offensive items as "an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a 
pie." PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND 
KEETON]. 
95 See Eove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 236 A.D. 37, 38, 258 N.Y.S. 229, 231 (1932) 
(allegations that gases and odors from plant entered plaintiff's property). 
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spatial proximity of incompatible activities, such as hog farms 
and most anything else.96 
Nuisance law, therefore, can only be an appropriate land use control 
in situations where offensive activities are located adjacent to fragile 
environmental areas. 97 Further, nuisance law is helpful for prevent-
ing the demise of sensitive lands only where a private landowner 
decides to sue a neighbor. 98 Thus, the doctrine's application in en-
vironmental protection is limited. 
Under the doctrine of public nuisance,99 however, a governmental 
unit may sue to enjoin an environmentally offensive land use from 
harming the surrounding natural resources. 100 If, for example, dis-
charge from a parcel into a river both killed fish and polluted the 
water, and it was deemed harmful to the public health and comfort, 
then it could be labelled as a public nuisance and the owner of the 
parcel could be prosecuted. 101 
Public nuisance law, however, currently has limited utility as a 
land use regulation. 102 It has been virtually pre-empted by zoning 
laws. Furthermore, nuisance offers little prospective control, is ex-
pensive to litigate, presents problems of proof, and tends towards 
the "extreme" remedy of injunction instead of monetary damages. 103 
F. Protective Covenants 
Another land use device for the protection of the environment is 
the protective covenant. 104 Protective covenants are generally pri-
96 W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 27. 
97 See generally PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 94, § 90, at 643-45 (listing various 
interferences with public health, including the pollution of a stream, as potential nuisances). 
A landowner may, however, in certain jurisdictions, bring an anticipatory nuisance action 
requesting injunctive relief for a nuisance that does not currently exist, but where it is obvious 
that a future land use by a neighbor will result in harm to that landowner's parcel. See 
generally Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the Anticipatory Nuisance 
Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627 (1988). The doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, 
however, is generally not accepted by state courts, and only two states have statutes that 
provide injunctive relief for anticipatory nuisances. See id. at 644-45. 
98 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303,314 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 
474 U.S. 980 (1985) (historical role of private nuisance law is to "resolv[el conflicts between 
neighboring, contemporaneous land uses") (emphasis in original). 
99 See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 94, § 86, at 618. Nuisances may be of the public 
or private variety. Id. Private nuisances usually refer solely to interference with a private 
right to use and enjoy land, while public nuisances refer more broadly to an interference with 
the rights of the community at large. I d. 
100 See id. § 90, at 643. 
101 See State ex rei. Wear v. Springfield Gun and Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942, 945 (Mo. App. 
1918). 
102 W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 27. 
103 See id. 
104 Id. 
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vate agreements between landowners, usually in the form offormally 
binding contracts or servitudes that, in effect, prescribe uses and 
restrictions upon neighboring lands. 105 While covenants are legally 
binding, they are usually drawn up among private parties for their 
own private benefit.106 Because private landowners are often guided 
by profit motives, they often have no financial incentive to protect 
the environment by covenants or other regulatory devices. 107 More-
over, private land use controls, by focusing on only a few parcels, 
are too narrow in scope to create an effective solution to the wide-
spread nature of environmental problems. 108 In sum, like nuisance 
law, covenants depend on private actions and force the government 
into a passive role in land use. Thus, covenants are also ineffective 
in protecting against environmentally harmful land use and devel-
opment. 
Overall, there are various land use devices that a local government 
can use to protect natural resource areas: Euclidean zoning, EIS's, 
purchasing and condemnation, donation and dedication, nuisance 
law, and protective covenants. Each, however, suffers from one or 
more deficiencies that reduces its effectiveness in protecting the 
environment. Environmental overlay zones, another land use device, 
address the most salient of these inadequacies and are, in effect, 
more environmentally sensitive land use devices. 
III. THE USE OF OVERLAY ZONES 
A. Overlay Zones in General 
A land use technique that addresses some of the shortcomings of 
previously suggested techniques is overlay zoning. Overlay zones 
are those zones, created by local legislative enactment, that are 
coterminous109 or circumscribed by an existing Euclidean zoning dis-
trict, and that impose additional regulations on the underlying 
zone. no A parcel within an overlay zone will thus be simultaneously 
105 Id. 
106 See id. (noting that covenants can be used to acquire air, mineral, and travel rights on 
another's land). 
107 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. 
108 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307,308, supra note 14, at 3 ("The necessity for gov-
ernmental involvement in environmentally sensitive lands comes from the essentially public 
character of those land resources. "). 
109 Having the same or coincident boundaries. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY 516 (1981). 
110 See CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 9, at 80. Overlay zoning "derive[s] its name from 
being drawn on tracing, mylar, or other translucent paper which was then placed or 'laid over' 
the official zoning map." Id. 
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subject to two sets of zoning regulations: the underlying and the 
overlay zoning requirements. 111 
Overlay zoning, like any other zoning ordinance, must meet legal 
formalities by being rationally related to the health, safety, welfare 
or morals of the general pUblic. 112 Although the case is known for its 
creation of "classic" Euclidean zoning, Euclid v. Ambler Realty113 
also indirectly upheld the validity of the less conventional overlay 
zoning. 114 By approving the City of Euclid's zoning ordinance, which 
divided the town into six classes of use districts and superimposed 
upon them three classes of height districts and four classes of area 
districts, the Court approved overlay zones along with traditional 
zones. 115 
If conflicts arise between the requirements of the overlay zone 
and the underlying zone, a municipal code will usually indicate which 
regulation will prevail. 116 The overlay regulations generally prevail 
because they are usually more restrictive.117 Communities can thus 
111 See J. COOK, ZONING FOR DOWNTOWN URBAN DESIGN 21 (1980). Municipalities can 
combine different types of zoning by use of "an overlay zone, a zone with special requirements 
(such as review procedures, height limits, or aesthetic review requirements) that covers more 
than one zoning district and does not change the underlying use and density standard." Id. 
Excerpts from Fairfax County, Virginia's Overlay District Regulations are helpful to show 
how a municipality may apply overlay zoning: 
§ 7-101. PURPOSE AND INTENT 
Overlay districts, as presented in this Article 7, are created for the purpose of 
imposing special regulations in given designated areas of the County to accomplish 
stated purposes that are set forth for each overlay district. 
Overlay districts shall be in addition to, and shall overlap and overlay all other 
zoning districts within which lands placed in each district also lie, so that any parcel 
of land lying in an overlay district shall also lie in one or more of the other zoning 
districts provided for by this Ordinance. 
§ 7-102. ESTABLISHMENT 
In general, overlay districts and amendments thereto shall be established in the 
same manner and by the same procedures set forth in Article 18 for other zoning 
districts provided for by this Ordinance, unless such procedures are qualified by the 
provisions of a particular overlay district as set forth herein. 
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7 (1977). 
112 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the constitutionality 
of environmental preservation zoning, see Kusler, Open Space Zoning: Valid Regulation or 
Invalid Taking?, 57 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1973). 
113 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
114 See id. at 380-84. 
115 See id. 
116 See, e.g., Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 3d 28, 33, 505 N.E.2d 
966, 970-71 (1987) (ordinance in question stated that "in the case of a conflict between the 
provision of an underlying zoning district and [the overlay district in question], the provision 
of the [overlay] district shall prevail"). 
117 E.g., Id. at 33, 505 N.E.2d at 971 (ov('rlay zone designed "to prohibit certain land uses 
that are otherwise permitted in the underlying zoning regulation"); see also PRINCE GEORGE'S 
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"map out" areas of concern, sometimes with the help of outside 
experts,118 and then implement an appropriate overlay zoning ordi-
nance. 119 
An overlay zone, due to its inherent flexibility, presents an at-
tractive alternative to a municipality that has already zoned the 
entire town and needs only to alter the zoning for the benefit of a 
specific area. An overlay zone is flexible because it may be specifically 
tailored to apply only to the underlying parcels requiring regula-
tion. 120 This flexibility saves the municipality the trouble and expense 
of amending the underlying zoning for just a few parcels,121 and does 
not affect the applicability of the underlying zoning regulations to 
every parcel in the district. 122 In addition, overlay zones may be 
utilized on a state- or region-wide basis to control land use in districts 
that extend over municipal boundaries. 123 
Further, an overlay zone is flexible because there is no precise 
format it must follow. 124 Rather, overlay zoning simply encompasses 
any additional zoning regulations that govern or modify the uses of 
any underlying district. 125 
COUNTY, MD., PROPOSED CHESAPEAKE BAY CRITICAL AREA PLAN AND POLICY OVERVIEW 
2-7 (May 21, 1987) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY OVERVIEW] ("The overlay zoning technique 
allows for the modification or augmentation of specific regulations while, for the most part, 
existing regulations remain intact."); COTTAGE GROVE, MINN., CITY CODE art. VIII, § 28-
69(c) (Supp. 1983) ("[W]ithin the overlay district, all uses shall be permitted in accordance 
with the regulations for the underlying zoning district(s); provided, that such uses shall not 
be entitled to or issued the appropriate development permit until they have first satisfied the 
additional requirements established in this article. "). 
118 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 2. 
119 See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text. In the event that the environmental area 
to be regulated transcends the boundaries of one or more towns, overlay zones may be 
implemented on a county, regional, or state level. Such legislation often delegates substantial 
responsibility to the municipalities included in the zone. See id. 
120 See A-S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 210, 258 S.E.2d 444, 455-57 
(1979) (98-acre historic overlay zone did not apply to modern State Medical Society building). 
This classification of regulated and non-regulated parcels must meet an equal protection 
challenge. Therefore, the classification must have a rational relation to the purpose and subject 
matter of the legislation. See id. at 911, 258 S.E.2d at 456. 
121 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at l. 
122 See A-S-P Associates, 298 N.C. at 212,258 S.E.2d at 458 ("that the creation of an overlay 
historic district may impose additional regulations on some property within an underlying use 
district and not on all of the property within it, does not destroy the uniformity of the 
regulations applicable to the underlying use district"). 
123 See infra notes 367-68, 370 and accompanying text for a discussion of overlay zones that 
protect environmentally sensitive areas that transcend municipal boundaries. 
124 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 4. 
125 Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio St. 3d 28, 33, 505 N.E.2d 966, 968 
(1987) (court upheld the enactment of "environmental quality districts" which regulate land 
in addition to underlying zoning). 
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B. Overlay Zones Used for Specific Purposes 
Overlay zones are flexible not only in their form, but also in the 
various land uses they can regulate. 126 For example, overlay zones 
are widely used to preserve historic buildings and areas in historic 
districts. 127 Other common overlay districts include airport noise 
impact zones,128 highway corridor overlay districts,129 agricultural 
overlay districts,130 and planned unit development (PUD) overlay 
zones. 131 
Local jurisdictions may also create special overlay zones tailored 
to their individual needs. 132 For example, Albuquerque, New Mex-
ico, has established a "Wall Overlay Zone" that regulates the height 
of walls or fences which are necessary or desired in front yards. 133 
Anaheim, California, utilizes a "Scenic Corridor Overlay Zone" to 
protect areas deemed to have distinctive scenic importance from 
poorly planned growth that would rob such areas of their aesthetic 
charm. 134 Other specialized uses of overlay zones are interface ov-
126 See infra notes 126-48 and accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-200 (1977); OKLAHOMA 
CITY, OKLA. MUNICIPAL CODE art. II, § 25-11.1 (1977); TUCSON, ARIZ., MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCES art. I, div. 28 (1977). Historic overlay zones are a means to enhance the educational, 
cultural, and economic welfare of a local jurisdiction by protecting groups of remaining build-
ings from a historic era in a municipality's history. See TUCSON, ARIZ., MUNICIPAL ORDI-
NANCES art. I, § 23-455 (1977). 
128 See FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-400 (1977). The airport noise 
impact zone controls conflicts between land uses and noise generated by aircraft by limiting 
uses of property, tailoring bulk regulations, and setting maximum interior noise level standards 
for different land use categories. TUCSON, ARIZ., MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES art. I, div. 24, 
§ 23-341; see also Fountain v. Jacksonville, 447 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); 
Laurita v. Torrance, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1069, 196 Cal. Rptr. 538, 542 n.2 (1983) (brief 
mention of airport overlay zones). 
129 See FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 7-600 (1977). Highway corridor 
overlay zones are invoked to limit, for example, for safety and aesthetic reasons, "the number 
of automobile-oriented uses" on highways. See id. at § 7-601. 
130 See, e.g., TOWN OF MUSKEGO, WAUKESHA COUNTY, WISC., ZONING ORDINANCES ch. 
17, § 9.05 (1985). For protection of existing agricultural areas, and areas of mixed use in which 
agriculture still has an important role, local governments may invoke agricultural overlay 
districts. Id. See also Ridgewood Phosphate Corp. v. Perkins, 487 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986) (example of agricultural zone with mineral extraction overlay). 
131 See Amcon v. City of Egan, 348 N.W.2d 66,71 n.4 (Minn. 1984) (noting example of PUD 
overlay). 
132 See infra notes 133-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of specialized overlay 
zones. 
133 CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, N.M., COMPREHENSIVE CITY ZONING CODE ch. 7, art. 14 
§ 39(A) (1987). 
134 ANAHEIM, CALIF., MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING CHAPTER § 18.84 (1987). 
1989] OVERLAY ZONING 633 
erlay zones,135 age specific overlay zones,136 and interim planning 
overlay districts. 137 
Another more specialized use of such zones is the environmental 
overlay zone. 138 In fact, most of those municipalities that have en-
acted local environmental regulatory programs have utilized overlay 
zones. 139 For example, San Diego, California, uses an overlay zone 
to protect the Tecolate Canyon Natural Park area from uncontrolled 
residential development. 14o Birmingham, Alabama, and New Hano-
ver County, North Carolina, have enacted more general natural 
resource conservation overlay districts to protect important envi-
ronmental resources that are located throughout the underlying 
zones. 141 
Spokane County and the City of South Tacoma, both in Washing-
ton state, have enacted overlay zones specifically to protect the 
quality of the regions' drinking water contained in groundwater 
aquifer systems. 142 In addition, Cottage Grove, Minnesota, has iso-
135 See, e.g., Explanatory Paper on Interface Zoning, presented by City of Merced, Calif. 
to Second Annual Zoning Institute, American Institute of City Planners (1982). The interface 
zone is used to achieve a compatible buffer zone for points at which heavy impact zoning 
directly borders upon light impact zoning. Id. 
136 See, e.g., MESA, ARIZ., ORDINANCE 1905 tit. XI, ch.3 § 11-3-9.5 (1985). Such zones are 
used to provide for planned retirement communities for senior citizens. Id. 
137 See, e.g., ZONING DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BOSTON art. 27, § 27-1 (1984). These zones 
are used to suspend existing zoning in an underlying district until new zoning ordinances are 
enacted to deal more accurately with the jurisdiction's zoning needs. Id. 
138 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 4 (Environmental overlay 
zones must be specialized since "the function of [these] resources is highly localized .... 
[T]hese functions will vary from site to site due to local conditions. "). 
139 See id. The following objectives of regulatory programs for environmentally sensitive 
lands are generally within the police power: protection against landslides, flooding, and 
drought; prevention against harmful by-products of land uses such as erosion, runoff, and 
water pollution. See id. Protection against air pollution and other offensive by-products of 
land uses are also within the police power. See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
140 See L.A. Times, Sept. 1, 1985, § J, at 1, col. 1 (San Diego County ed.). 
l41 See BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GEN'L CITY CODE art. 23, § 11 (1981); NEW HANOVER COUNTY, 
N.C., GEN'L COUNTY CODE (ZONING) § 59.4 (modified Feb. 3, 1986). New Hanover County's 
conservation overlay zone exists specifically for the preservation of ecological resources such 
as swamp forests, natural ponds, primary nursery areas, and salt marshes. It thus subjects 
development within or affecting such areas to the requirements of both the underlying district 
and the overlay zone. See NEW HANOVER COUNTY, N.C., GENERAL COUNTY CODE (ZONING) 
§§ 59.4-2 to 54.4-3(1). Specific regulations within the ordinance regulate density requirements, 
conservation space preservation, buffer strips, conservation space setbacks, and retention of 
runoff from developed areas. Id. at §§ 59.4-4 to 59.4-5. 
142 See GENERAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SPOKANE COUNTY, WASH., Section 10 (Water 
Quality), § 4.16A.000 (1983); SOUTH TACOMA, WASH. MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 13.09, § 010 (1985). 
While both jurisdictions' overlay zones focus on the regulation of development within the 
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lated a single environmental area within its borders, the Mississippi 
River, and has chosen to protect it through the use of an overlay 
zone. 143 In this zone, Cottage Grove regulates growth in the vicinity 
of the river to protect the river's transportation, ecological and 
recreational benefits to the area. 144 Other environmental overlay 
zones may regulate floodplain areas,145 quarries,146 greenbelts,147 and 
seashore areas. 148 
C. Overlay Zones as Efficient Protectors of Natural Resources 
Overlay zoning is more effective at protecting environmentally 
sensitive lands than other land use controls because it adequately 
addresses the weaknesses of those controls149 and takes an additional 
step to further protect the environment. 150 Overlay zoning meets the 
shortcoming of pure Euclidean zoning-protecting social and eco-
nomic values while ignoring environmental values _151 by allowing 
municipalities to create zones specifically for regulating the treat-
ment and effects of development on the environment. 152 
areas of aquifers, their main concentration is on the regulation of storage and disposal of toxic 
chemicals in the underlying zones. Spokane County's plan in particular is explicit in guiding 
those who are required to apply for permits to use certain toxic materials on their property 
by providing a list of virtually hundreds of "critical materials" and required EPA categorization 
of such materials. See GENERAL COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR SPOKANE COUNTY, WASH., 
Section 10 (Water Quality) § 4. 16A.080 (1983). The plan also sets standards for disposal, 
mining, and usage of such materials in the zone. See id. at §§ 4.16 A.070, 4.16A.080. 
143 COTTAGE GROVE, MINN., ZONING ORDINANCES art. VII, § 28-69(b) (1983) (Mississippi 
River Corridor Critical Area Overlay District). 
144 [d. Like the aforementioned overlay zones, supra note 142, Cottage Grove's provides 
standards for sewage disposal, subdivision of property, and bulk requirements, as well as 
natural resource management requirements, all more restrictive than the underlying zones. 
[d. at §§ 28.73, 28.75. 
145 See Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Summerhill Township, 108 Pa. 
Commw. 113, 116, 529 A.2d 585, 586 (1987); Tohickon Valley Transfer, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing 
Bd. of Tinicum Township, 97 Pa. Commw. 244, 257, 509 A.2d 896, 902 (1986). 
146 See Maresh v. Yamhill County, 68 Ore. App. 471, 473, 683 P.2d 124, 126 (1984). 
147 See Allingham v. City of Seattle, 109 Wash. 2d 947, 948, 749 P.2d 160, 161 (1988); J.R. 
Golf Serv., Inc. v. Linn County, 62 Ore. App. 360, 366, 661 P.2d 91,95 n.4 (1982). 
148 See Barrie v. California Coastal Comm'n, 196 Cal. App. 3d 8, 13, 241 Cal. Rptr. 477, 479 
(1987); Shafmaster v. Town of Kittery, 496 A.2d 848, 851 (Me. 1984). 
149 See infra notes 151-66 and accompanying text. 
150 See infra notes 167-71 for a discussion of performance standards. 
151 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 26-27. 
152 See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmentally 
specialized overlay zones. In addition, overlay zones are specifically designed to conform to 
the area and shape of the underlying protected land. See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 
308, supra note 14, at 2. Moreover, the protection of these zones is strengthened because 
overlay zones generally establish buffer zones around them. [d. at 2, 5. Thus, environmental 
lands that are particularly sensitive to the immediately surrounding lands, such as wetlands, 
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Overlay zoning also makes up for the shortcomings in federal, 
state, and local NEPA's which suffer from subjective EIS reports. 153 
Overlay zones utilize objective standards rather than developer-
imposed standards to measure environmental impact. l54 In addition, 
overlay zones correct another shortcoming of the NEPA process-
lack of administrative and judicial review of EISs155-in that all 
zoning action is subject to administrative review through a desig-
nated appeals board and then, once administrative appeals are ex-
hausted, an aggrieved party may have access to the courtS. 156 Ov-
erlay zoning, in effect, mimics the EIS process, which is NEPA's 
attempt to superimpose environmental consideration upon land use 
regulation. 157 Overlay zones, however, do so with objective standards 
that help eliminate conflicts of interest and are more attuned to 
environmental protection. 158 
The utilization of overlay zones also makes up for the inadequacy 
of local governments' other alternatives for protecting environmen-
tally sensitive lands. 159 First, overlay zones, although requiring the 
cost of studies and the time taken in order to enact them, are much 
less expensive to implemenV60 than outright purchases of land re-
quired under condemnation. 161 Further, because the government 
takes an active stance in land use control, overlay zones make up 
for the inadequate passive stance a local government takes when 
relying upon donation162 or dedication163 as a means of land use 
control. 
Conservation overlay zones, involving government action, also 
make up for the inefficiencies of private covenants,164 because the 
streams, and aquifers, are offered even greater protection. Id. Further, overlay zones may 
be utilized on a region-wide basis and protect environmental areas that transcend municipal 
boundaries. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text. 
164 Id. Overlay zones use performance standards which provide government-imposed stan-
dards with which developments must comply. See infra notes 167-71 and accompanying text. 
155 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 29. 
166 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40A, §§ 15-17 (West 1979) (Massachusetts Zoning 
Act's provisions for zoning board approval and judicial review of board decisions). 
157 See Palmer, supra note 4"at 33. 
158 Cf. supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing the subjectivity of the NEPA 
process and its attendant problems). 
159 See infra notes 160-66 and accompanying text. 
160 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 1. 
161 See New England Sierran, supra note 35, at 1, col. 3 (noting increasing real estate 
prices). 
162 See Livingston, supra note 66, at 780. 
163 See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text. 
164 W. FISCHEL, supra note 47, at 27. 
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zoning enables a locality to actively formulate an environmentally 
protective plan with a view toward the entire district. 165 Lastly, 
overlay zoning, with its inherent flexibility,166 is a more desirable 
tool for land use than is rigid nuisance law. Thus, overlay zones 
overcome all the most salient deficiencies of other traditional land 
use controls. Further, as will be set forth in Section IV, overlay 
zones utilize performance standards which provide additional envi-
ronmental protection. 
IV. PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
A. General Discussion 
Not only do overlay zones meet most of the inadequacies of other 
land use controls, but they also go one step further in protecting 
environmentally sensitive areas by establishing performance stan-
dards. 167 Performance standards are defined as "criteri[a] established 
to control noise, odor, smoke, toxic or noxious matter, vibration, 
fire, and explosive hazards, and glare or heat generated by or in-
herent in uses of land or buildings. "168 Performance standards can 
also be used to regulate stormwater runoff, soil erosion, and vege-
tation protection. 169 Communities utilizing overlay zones maintain 
existing Euclidean zoning but add another level of regulation through 
special use provisions. 17o 
Through these provisions, ... landowner[s] must use [their] land 
for uses other than those specified in the [Euclidean zoning] 
ordinance if [they] meet specific environmental performance cri-
teria. These criteria generally delineate the key functions that 
the community wishes to preserve, such as the water retention 
capabilities of wetlands. [Landowners are] allowed to develop 
the land any way [they wish] if [they] can show that it will not 
adversely affect these natural processes. 171 
165 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (noting inadequacy of passive land use con-
trols). 
166 See supra notes 120-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the flexibility of overlay 
zoning. 
167 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 96 (development of perfor-
mance controls takes place on the second level of Euclidean zoning). 
168 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note 11, at § 16.11, at 67. 
169 See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 5 (provides standards for all 
three areas). 
170 See id. at 96. 
171 Id. 
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Performance standards are a supplement to and not a replacement 
for overlay zones. 172 The overlay segregates the environmental area 
to be protected, and the performance standards preserve natural 
functions or processes independent of the zonal designation. 173 Thus, 
the protection of environmentally sensitive lands occurs on two lev-
els: the delineation of the areas to be preserved (overlay zoning) and 
the creation of performance standards for all such land similarly 
situated. 174 
Performance standards were created initially to represent a more 
environmentally sensitive type of land use control.175 Performance 
standards, like overlay zones, were developed to combat the inflex-
ibility of Euclidean zoning in light of increasing land demands of 
industrial development and its attendant population growth.176 Spe-
cifically, performance standards compensate for conventional zoning 
ordinances' lack of standards for protecting land uses from adverse 
impact from adjoining land uses. 177 
Although no local government has totally abolished its Euclidean 
zoning districts,178 many have adopted performance standards to 
compensate for the major shortcomings of Euclidean zoning. 179 Spe-
cifically, performance standards address the inherent weaknesses in 
traditional ordinances that define permitted and prohibited uses in 
a zone. 180 Because this list-type zoning cannot possibly encompass 
all uses that may exist in the future, and because it ignores the wide 
variations of impact of different uses, it is inherently inefficient. 181 
Performance standards rectify this situation by allowing all uses as 
long as each and every use meets the standards for that district. 182 
172 See id. at 97. 
173 See id. 
174 See id. Performance standards used in an overlay zone further protect the environment 
because they require all landowners in a buffer zone, not just those within or immediately 
adjacent to the protected area, to adhere to the standards. [d. 
175 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 741. While performance standards are often required in 
industrial zones, they are also used in other zones, including residential zones. See id. at 764; 
see also Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 449-50, 242 A.2d 757, 758-59 (1968) (air conditioner in 
residential neighborhood found violative of performance standards implied in zoning ordi-
nance); Goodfriend, Noise Protection in Residence Zones, 15 ZONING DIG. 233 (1963) (noting 
noise pollution abatement capacity of performance standards). 
176 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 741. 
177 L. KENDIG, PERFORMANCE ZONING 10 (1980). 
178 See Cunningham, Land Use Control-State and Local Programs, 50 IOWA L. REV. 367, 
411 (1965). 
179 See ANDERSON (3D), supra note 15, at 238-39 (1986). 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 239. 
182 See id. Performance standards can also be combined with the typical "list-type" zoning. 
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Performance standards are either of the "primitive" or "precision" 
variety,l83 and environmental overlay zones can contain both types. 184 
Primitive standards have a more general character. 185 For example, 
an ordinance that prohibits "[land uses] which will emit any offensive 
odor, dust, noxious gas, noise, vibration, smoke, heat or glare be-
yond the boundaries of the lot on which such use is conducted"186 is 
a primitive variety because violations are defined by the general 
term "offensive. "187 Primitive standards have their roots in the com-
mon law of nuisance. 188 Thus, an Illinois court upheld an ordinance 
that required that the noise and fumes of manufacturing plants not 
be "disagreeable or annoying. "189 The court reasoned that the statute 
merely codified the common law of nuisance. 19o Primitive standards 
also include standards developed from the basis of four variables:191 
open space ratio,192 impervious surface ratio,193 density,194 and floor 
area ratio. 195 
See Dube v. Chicago, 7 Ill. 2d 313, 317-18, 131 N.E.2d 9, 11-12 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 
1013 (1956) (court held constitutional an ordinance that listed permissible uses and required 
that such uses meet performance standards). 
183 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 75l. 
184 See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text. 
185 Cf. Gillespie, supra note 12, at 751 (noting that primitive standards are less objective 
and less technically explicit than precision standards). 
186 State v. Zack, 138 Ariz. 266, 268, 674 P.2d 329, 331 (1983) (term "offensive vibration" 
used in ordinance defining heavy industrial uses was definable and hence not unconstitutionally 
vague). 
187Id. at 268, 674 P.2d at 332. 
188 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 748-49 (noting numerous cases utilizing nuisance lan-
guage). For a brief general discussion of the law of nuisance, see supra notes 94-103 and 
accompanying text. 
189 See Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, Inc., 398 Ill. 202, 204, 75 N.E.2d 355, 358 
(1947). 
190 See id. 
191 L. KENDIG, supra note 177, at 25. For purposes of this Comment, such standards based 
on these variables are also classified as primitive, even though they are measured numerically, 
because they do not meet the definition of true precision standards. See infra notes 199-202 
and accompanying text. 
192 L. KENDIG, supra note 177, at 26. The open space ratio measures the proportions of a 
site, excluding land occupied by private lots or road right-of-ways, which remain undeveloped 
and is specifically designated as open space. Id. To calculate, one must divide acres of open 
space by gross site area. Id. 
193Id. at 27. The impervious surface ratio measures the proportion of impervious land of a 
site. I d. To calculate, one must divide acres of impervious surface area by gross site area. I d. 
194 Id. at 28. Density measures dwelling units per acre. Id. To calculate, one must divide 
the number of dwelling units by the gross site area. Id. 
195Id. at 29. Floor area ratio measures density in non-residential areas. Id. To calculate, 
one must divide the area of all floors of a building by the total area of the site. Id. 
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Conversely, precision standards are grounded in scientific data 
and are measured by quantifying values. 196 For example, the Soil 
Conservation Service has scientifically developed a model to measure 
the volume of runoff of a proposed development base on storm flow 
records. 197 In addition, the American Planning Association has de-
veloped technical methodology to compute minimum road widths for 
planning purposes. 198 
Some commentators further distinguish true precision standards 
as those containing both scientifically developed means of measure-
ment and a scientifically known and accepted level of performance. 199 
In light of this definition of true precision standards, and given the 
fact that advances in technology have enabled scientists to precisely 
quantify acceptable performance standards,20o any standards that do 
not meet both criteria may be considered less than precise, and will 
be, in effect, primitive standards. 201 
Thus, for purposes of this Comment, primitive standards are de-
fined as those containing general language and based on nuisance 
law as well as those with some quantifiable standards that do not 
meet both scientific criteria. 202 Compared to precision standards, 
primitive standards do not afford the best protection against possible 
arbitrary enforcement by local governments. 203 
196 Cf. Gillespie, supra note 12, at 751 (comparing precision and primitive standards and 
noting that precision standards contain scientific findings). 
197 INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 98. The formula is Q = 0-0.25)2 
/ (I + 0.85) (Q = direct surface runoff in inches, I = storm rainfall in inches, S is the difference 
between the rainfall and the runoff). Id. The calculation of the S value is the critical factor in 
determining the effects of development on the volume of runoff produced. Id. Two Illinois 
jurisdictions, Chicago and Naperville, were among the first to adopt this precision standard. 
See id. at 98-99. 
198 L. KENDIG, supra note 177, at 330. 
199 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 270 (citing Schulze, Performance Standards in Zoning, 
10 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS'N 156, 158 (1960)). 
200 See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
201 Cf. McDougal, supra note 13. This Comment adopts the view cited by one commentator 
that true precision standards are those containing both scientific criteria. 
202 I d. at 271. 
208 Cf. id. at 270-71 (recognizing that courts have not required primitive standards to provide 
complete protection against arbitrariness). Other commentators, however, disagree with this 
strict two-step scientific requirement. McDougal argues that this requirement could not be 
met by a majority of existing industrial performance standards. Id. at 270. If these standards 
were then held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, performance standards would not be "a 
viable concept for providing adequate protection to uses of land from adverse by-products or 
other land uses." Id. For a discussion of the validity of primitive standards when compared 
to these scientific standards, see supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text. 
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B. General Validity of Performance Standards 
Courts give great deference to municipalities in promulgating per-
formance standards because such standards are derived from the 
police power. 204 So long as the end is legitimate, courts will only 
inquire whether the means chosen are sufficiently related to that 
end in deciding whether to uphold the standards.205 The performance 
standards must not be arbitrary or capricious. 206 
There are, however, only a small number of cases that directly 
rule on the validity of performance standards. 207 Two Illinois deci-
sions, Dube v. City of Chicago,208 and International Harvester Co. 
v. Chicago Zoning Board of Appeals,209 upheld the validity of a 
primitive ordinance that banned land uses which "cause substantial 
injury" to neighboring property values and violate general standards 
concerning noise, vibration, and other offensive land use by-prod-
uctS. 21O The court in Dube found that such an ordinance was not 
arbitrary because it could be interpreted by using a nuisance stan-
dard,2l1 while the International Harvester court impliedly upheld 
the validity of the ordinance. 212 
204 See supra notes 205-21 and accompanying text. 
205 See DeCoals v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Westover, 284 S.E.2d 856, 858 (W. 
Va. 1981). The court held that performance standards are a legitimate way to regulate 
potentially offensive effects on land development. "So long as there is a reasonable basis in 
available information, and rationality in chosen courses of conduct to alleviate an accepted 
evil, there is no constitutional infirmity." Id. at 854 (citing United States v. Carolene Prod., 
304 U.S. 144, 151-54 (1938)). 
206 See ANDERSON (3D), supra note 15, at 240-42 (noting cases where courts have required 
some degree of definitiveness in statutory language). Although there are no cases that hold 
that a state's land use enabling legislation actually authorizes performance standards, judicial 
approval may be inferred from previous approval of such land use devices as conditional 
zoning, floating zones, planned unit developments, cluster zoning and exactions. Gillespie, 
supra note 12, at 745. 
207 See 4 WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 103.02, at 414 (1986). The ensuing 
section of this Comment is a general discussion of the validity of overlay zones and does not 
necessarily refer to those performance standards used by overlay zones. This Comment will 
argue, however, that a combination of overlay zones and performance standards serves as an 
effective means of protecting environmentally sensitive lands. See infra notes 367-70. 
208 7 Ill. 2d 313, 131 N.E.2d 9 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 1013 (1956). 
209 43 Ill. App. 2d 440, 193 N.E.2d 856 (1963). 
210 See id. at 443-44, 193 N.E.2d at 858. 
211 See Dube, 7 Ill. 2d at 327-28, 131 N.E.2d at 16 (court's decision based on testimony of 
six neighbors who testified about serious discomfort caused by noise from plant). 
212 See International Harvester, 43 Ill. App. 2d at 450-51, 193 N.E.2d at 861 (ordinance not 
invalidated even though the court found performance standards in general to be "intricate and 
confusing" and to create difficulty in showing intended compliance). 
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A more recent West Virginia case directly supports the validity 
of performance standards. 213 The court, in DeCoals, Inc. v. Board 
of Zoning Appeals of the City of Westover,214 upheld the city's in-
dustrial primitive standards that regulated dust and "objectional 
noise" by affirming the board's recision of a permit215 for a coal 
tipple. 216 The court upheld the validity of the standards over a sub-
stantive due process claim because the ordinance was reasonable and 
closely related to the legitimate state goal of protecting the public 
from offensive land uses. 217 Lastly, in 1983, an Arizona court upheld 
an ordinance that prohibited "offensive vibrations"218 because the 
term was easily definable219 and because the offensiveness could be 
measured in terms of a reasonable person standard. 220 This case is 
representative of the judiciary's long-standing tradition of deference 
to performance standards.221 
213 DeCoals, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of City of Westover, 284 S.E.2d 856 (W. Va. 
1981). 
214 [d. 
215 [d. at 858. The ordinance in relevant part required that: 
... [Nlo dust of any kind produced by the industrial operations shall be permitted 
to escape beyond the limits of the property being used . 
. . . A maximum level of 70 decibels at the property line is permitted. Noise is 
required to be muffled so as not to become objectionable due to intermittance, beat 
frequency or shrillness. Sound may equal but not exceed street traffic noise in the 
vicinity during a normal day shift work period. 
[d. (quoting Westover, W.Va., zoning ordinance) 
216 A coal tipple is an apparatus by which loaded coal cars are emptied, and sometimes 
include an elevated runway or framework upon which cars are run for tipping. WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2398 (1981). 
217 See DeCoals, 284 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Caster v. City of Bluefield, 132 W. Va. 881, 54 
S.E.2d 747, 750 (1949)). 
218 State v. Zack, 138 Ariz. 266, 269, 674 P.2d 329, 332 (1983) (court upheld ordinance which 
disallowed offensive heavy industrial uses to be located near commercial or residential uses). 
219 See id. 
220 [d. 
221 [d. Other cases through the years have mentioned performance standards in dicta. See, 
e.g., City of Des Plaines v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 65 Ill. 2d 1, 357 N.E.2d 433 (1976) 
(adoption by state of Environmental Protection Agency standards of noise control regulations 
preempted city from adopting its own concurrent performance standards); Southern Rock 
Prod. Co. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of Trussville, 282 Ala. 186, 210 So. 2d 419, 421 
(1968) (ordinance referred to "objectional conditions"); Nair v. Thaw, 156 Conn. 445, 242 A.2d 
757 (1968) (performance standards as applied to residential uses must comport with ordinary 
nuisance law); Fetsch v. Police J. Ct. of the Village of Sands Point, 7 A.D.2d 854, 181 N. Y.S.2d 
904 (1959) (upheld ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to make any loud, unnec-
essary or unusual noise that disturbs the peace and quiet of the village); Township of West 
Bloomfield v. Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W.2d 377 (1958) (operation of noisy machine shop 
in agricultural zone held to violate expected performance standards of such zone). 
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The validity of performance standards, however, is not without 
its limits. 222 In Phillips Petroleum v. Anderson,223 the court found 
an ordinance that stated that "no operation shall be carried on which 
is injurious to . . . other properties, or to the occupants thereof by 
reason of the objectional emission of cinders, dust, dirt, fumes, gas, 
odor, noise, etc ..... "224 unconstitutionally vague and an invalid 
delegation of legislative power.225 The court's rationale was based 
solely on the broad language of the ordinance, which was found too 
vague to be enforced fairly.226 The "tendency of immediate neighbors 
to object" placed the landowner "wholly at the whim and mercy of 
his neighbors. "227 The use in the ordinance of the words "public 
nuisance" to describe the offensiveness would have cured the ordi-
nance of its vagueness because that term is a definable term of art. 228 
The Phillips case, however, is from one of only a small minority 
of courts that reject outright primitive standards as arbitrary. 229 
Other courts have rejected primitive standards on grounds other 
than facial arbitrariness. 23o In Kenville Realty Corp. v. Board of 
Zoning Appeals of Briarcliff Manor,231 for example, the court struck 
down an ordinance that prohibited uses that were "offensive, obnox-
ious or detrimental by reasons of vibration, dust, fumes, odor, noise, 
lights or traffic generation and resultant congestion. "232 The Kenville 
court, however, treated primitive standards more favorably than did 
the Phillips court. The court's rationale was not that the primitive 
ordinance was generally arbitrary, but that less subjective noise 
control standards were feasible and necessary.233 The court's dicta 
suggested that the actual term "nuisance" does not have to appear 
in a statute in order for it to be valid. 234 
Rather, the Kenville court stated that because such a term is 
generally understood by laypeople, and because in an industrialized 
222 See infra notes 224-41 and accompanying text. 
223 74 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1954). 
224 Id. at 545 (emphasis added). 
225 See id. at 547. 
2"l6 See id. (ordinance was held violative of rule "which requires an intelligible principle to 
be laid down for the guidance of an administrative official in the performance of his duties"). 
227 I d. at 548. 
228 See id. 
229 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 271 n.66. 
230 I d. at 27l. 
231 Kenville Realty Corp. v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Village of Briarcliff Manor, 48 Misc. 
2d 666,265 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1965). 
232 See id. at 667,265 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24. 
233 Id. at 668, 265 N. Y.S.2d at 525. 
234 See id. at 667-68, 265 N. Y.S.2d at 524. 
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society more and more protection is being entrusted to public offi-
cials, performance standards do not have to be couched in precise 
language. 235 The courts, instead, must find a middle ground between 
'''strait-jacketing' public officials and ensuring rule of law rather than 
by caprice."236 Courts should afford great flexibility to public officials 
and they should be presumed to be acting rationally and legally in 
promulgating primitive performance standards. 237 
Another court struck down a primitive standard on grounds other 
than that the ordinance, as a primitive standard, was inherently 
arbitrary. In Beaver v. Borough of Johnsonburg, 238 an ordinance that 
prohibited "[a]ll uses of land, building, and structures ... that may 
be noxious or injurious by reason of the production or emission of 
dust, smoke, refuse matter, [etc.] .... " was invalidated. 239 The 
court did not rule that the ordinance was vague on its face, but found 
that it did not contain the criteria a local administrative board would 
use to make permit decisions. 24o Similarly, courts have invalidated 
other ordinances for failure to state definite standards. 241 
Though there are exceptions, courts have generally upheld the 
validity of primitive performance standards. 242 Lately, however, as 
the frontiers of technological expertise are expanding, performance 
standards are becoming increasingly precise. 243 Various studies in-
dicate that there has been an increase in the scientific regulation of 
the following nuisance conditions: noise, smoke, dirt and dust, toxic 
gasses, glare, heat combustible phenomena, electromagnetic inter-
ference, industrial sewage waste, and transportation modes. 244 The 
onslaught of scientific or technological information has encouraged 
235 See id. 
236 [d. 
237 See id. 
238 410 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1976). 
239 [d. at 558. 
240 See id. 
241 See, e.g., Exton Quarries Inc. v. Zoning Ed. of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 
(1967) (blanket restriction against quarries as they are dust producers found to be invalid 
because there was no evidence to support that dust created by quarry would be harmful to 
town); Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514 (1965) (lack of 
certain and definite standards will invalidate zoning ordinances); Norate Corp. v. Zoning Ed. 
of Adjustment of Upper Moreland Township, 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965) (ordinance that 
allowed zoning board to grant special exceptions "as they may deem necessary" was so 
arbitrary as to be invalidated). 
242 See supra notes 207-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general validity 
of primitive performance standards. 
243 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 755-57. 
244 See id. at 756. 
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municipalities to adopt precise standards whenever possible. 245 Be-
cause there is overwhelming judicial approval of primitive standards 
that are clearly drafted, non-arbitrary, and couched in terms of 
public nuisance, more definite precision standards, meeting the same 
requirements, will more likely receive judicial approval. 246 
The judicial approval and widespread adoption of precise stan-
dards, however, might be a cause to question the adequacy, effec-
tiveness, and validity of primitive standards. 247 In light of the clear-
cut language and numerical terminology of precision standards, the 
general "reasonable person" language of primitive standards may 
seem relatively arbitrary.248 In the same vein, standards that are 
not true precision standards-those that do not contain both a sci-
entifically developed means of measurement and a scientifically 
known and accepted level of performance249-may also seem arbi-
trary.250 Hence, the fate of overlay zones that utilize both kinds of 
performance standards is arguably uncertain, if one of the zones' 
components is found to be invalid and arbitrary.251 These contingen-
cies must be analyzed in the wake of recent land use decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court. 
V. THE VALIDITY OF PRIMITIVE STANDARDS AFTER NOLLAN V. 
CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION 
The outlook for the continued validity of primitive standards is 
uncertain after the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Nollan v. Cal-
ifornia Coastal Commission. 252 Essentially, N ollan requires that 
land use regulations '''substantially advance legitimate state 
interests"'253 and that there be an essential "nexus" between the land 
use regulation and the state's land use goals. 254 
245 [d. at 757. 
246 See ANDERSON (3D), supra note 15, at 241-42. This is true, provided, of course, that 
there is ample evidence to support the standards. See supra notes 206-4l. 
247 See Gillespie, supra note 12, at 757. 
248 Cf. id. at 751 (Precision standards may seem less arbitrary because "standards grounded 
on scientific data presuppos[e] a valid technical method to measure the nuisance factor, and 
clear determination of when and under what conditions it produces intolerable human stress 
and property damage."). 
249 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
250 See id. 
251 See infra notes 367-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of environmental overlay 
zones that utilize both primitive and precision performance standards. 
252 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
253 [d. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). 
254 [d. at 3148. 
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A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
N ollan involved oceanfront property owners who wished to re-
place their cottage with a larger home. 255 The Nollans' lot, located 
in Ventura County, California, was situated between two public 
beaches, Faria County Park and an area known locally as "the 
Cove."256 The California Coastal Commission (the "Commission"), 
which had jurisdiction over beachfront development,257 issued a 
building permit to the N ollans with the condition that they allow a 
public easement to cross the ocean side of their property.258 The 
Commission instituted the condition on the grounds that the increase 
in private oceanfront structures prevented the public from having 
"psychological access" to the public beaches located nearby. 259 
The N ollans sued for a writ of administrative mandamus, asking 
that the permit condition be stricken on fifth amendment grounds. 260 
Specifically, the N ollans argued that because the Commissiol1 did 
not prove that their proposed construction would directly affect 
beach access, the condition could not be legally imposed261 because 
it would amount to an unconstitutional taking. 262 The Ventura 
County Superior Court agreed and the Commission appealed.263 
255 Id. at 3143. The cottage, a rental home, had been in the family for over thirty years and 
had fallen into disrepair. I d. The N ollans wished to demolish it and replace it with a permanent 
three-bedroom home. Id. 
256Id. 
257 See id. The permit was required under sections 30106, 30212, and 30600 of the California 
Public Resources Code. Id. 
258 Id. Specifically, the permit required that the easement be granted to allow travel between 
an eight foot high seawall on the Nollan's property and the mean high tide line. Id. Ironically, 
the Nollans had always allowed some form of public easement on this part of their land. L.A. 
Daily J., June 29, 1987, at 6, col. 2. Said James Nollan, "'So long as the people who've crossed 
[the easement] have been well-behaved, we've never had any need to remove anyone, but 
we've had a right to if there was a problem. We have no plans to fence off the property or do 
anything different [after the Supreme Court's decision].'" Id. 
259 Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. After a public hearing, the Commission found that "the new 
house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus contributing to the development 
of 'a "wall" of residential structures' that would prevent the public 'psychologically ... from 
realizing a stretch of coastline existing nearby that they have every right to visit. ", I d. at 
3143-44 (quoting the Commission's report). The Commission also found that the construction 
would add to private use of the shore front and hinder the public's ability to traverse the 
beaches. Id. at 3144. 
26°Id. at 3144. The fifth amendment requires, inter alia, that no "private property [shall 
be] taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
261 Id. at 3143. 
262Id. at 3144. 
263Id. at 3143-44. During the appeal period, the Nollans began the construction on their 
home without informing the Commission. Id. at 3144. 
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In 1986, the California Court of Appeal reversed the lower court,264 
holding that the permit condition was sufficiently related to burdens 
on public beach access created by the Nollans' project, and was thus 
constitutional.265 Relying on the reasoning of Grupe v. California 
Coastal Commission,266 the court found that such conditions are 
valid even if the burdens on access are not created solely by the 
proposed project and the relationship between access and the project 
is merely an indirect one. 267 
A year later, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal's 
decision because a state land use regulation must substantially ad-
vance a state's interest and must not deny an owner economically 
viable use of his land268 or it will "effect a taking of [the land]."269 
The decision cites other Supreme Court cases in which the land use 
ordinances in question "substantial[ly] advance[ d]" governmental 
purposes. 270 In Euclid v. Ambler Realty,271 for instance, the govern-
mental division of the city's land into various use districts substan-
tially advanced the protection of the health, safety, welfare, and 
morals of the public. 272 Such division would, among other things, 
reduce the risks of fire and traffic accidents, decrease noise pollution, 
preserve the character of residential areas, and help to minimize 
urban blight. 273 
The Nollan Court also cites Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City.274 There, the Court upheld the city's rejection of 
plans to construct a fifty-three story office building over and to 
remove portions of the facade of the French beaux-arts style train 
station. 275 The Court reasoned that a regulation restricting altera-
tions that could be made to landmark buildings adequately advanced 
the government's interest in preserving structures with special his-
264 NoJlan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1986). 
265 [d. at 724, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 31. 
266 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985) (permit condition requiring owner to 
dedicate public easement across beachfront property upheld as sufficiently related to state's 
goal of increasing public beach access). 
267 See NoJlan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3144 (1987). 
268 [d. at 3146 (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)). 
269 [d. 
270 [d. at 3147. 
271 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
272 See id. at 394-97. 
273 See id. at 394-95. 
274 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
275 See id. at 138. 
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torical significance. 276 The Court also cited Agins v. Tiburon,277 which 
held that zoning ordinances that restricted developments on a tract 
of land in a scenic preservation zone to five single-family residential 
units, accessory buildings, and open-space uses "substantially ad-
vanced" the government's goal of protecting against the "ill effects 
of urbanization. "278 
The permit condition in Nollan, however, did not adequately ad-
vance the government's land use goals. Justice Scalia, writing for 
the majority, found a lack of nexus between the permit conditions 
and the government's stated purpose of promoting public access to 
the beaches.279 It was inconceivable to Scalia "how a requirement 
that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the 
Nollans' property reduce[d] any obstacles to viewing the beach cre-
ated by the new house"28o or lessened any "psychological barrier" to 
use of the nearby public beaches. 281 
The Court also stated that the easement would not help anyone 
on the road looking seaward realize that there was a public beach 
nearby because their view of beachgoers using the easement would 
be blocked by the N ollans' eight-foot high seawall. 282 Further, such 
access would not serve to eliminate added congestion on the beach 
caused by the new house's construction. 283 For these reasons, the 
easement condition on the N ollans' permit "utterly fail[ ed] to dem-
onstrate a nexus between the government regulation and the gov-
ernment objective of achieving psychological access to public 
beaches,"284 and was deemed to be an unconstitutional taking.285 
Justice Brennan vigorously dissented in an opinion in which Justice 
Marshall joined. 286 The first argument was that the majority's deci-
276 ld. 
277 447 u.s. 255 (1980). 
278 See id. at 26l. 
279 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987). 
28°ld. at 3149. 
281Id. 
282 I d. at 3150. 
283 ld. at 3149. 
284 ld. at 3148. 
285 See id. at 3150. 
286 See id. at 3150-64. There were two additional dissenting opinions. Justice Blackmun 
dissented, and joined Justice Stevens in his dissent. Blackmun reiterated Brennan's arguments 
by criticizing the Court's creation of a new "'eye for an eye'" nexus standard as "rigid" and 
unfounded. See id. at 3162-63. Further, Blackmun stated that "[tjraditional takings analysis 
compels the conclusion that there is not a taking here." ld. at 3163. In the other dissenting 
opinion, Stevens argued that because land use regulation is inherently complex and uncertain, 
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sion was "an aberration, "287 and that the proper standard of review 
for the validity of a state land use regulation is not a "substantial 
advancement" test, but rather a "rational relations" test. 288 For most 
of this century, the Court had rejected a standard more strict than 
a rationality test. 289 In addition, it would be unrealistic to expect 
local governments making complex natural resource decisions to 
comply with such a strict standard. 290 
Brennan's other major argument was that even if the new "sub-
stantial advancement" test were applicable, the Commission's permit 
conditions met the test. 291 The ability to see beachgoers traversing 
the dry sand in front of the N oHans' home would advance the Com-
mission's goal of increasing the public's "psychological access" to the 
beaches. 292 Further, the permit condition would also adequately sup-
port the Commission's other goal of reducing private domination of 
the shorefront. 293 
The majority responded to Brennan's "substantial advancement" 
argument by stating that the public's access would not be improved 
by the granting of the easement. 294 Brennan's latter argument of 
reducing private use of the beachfront was not at issue before the 
Court. 295 As it now stands, though, Nollan's "substantial advance-
ment" test is the law, and land use regulations must be analyzed in 
that light. 296 
B. Testing the Validity of Primitive Standards After NoHan 
Primitive and precision standards both serve to limit the offensive 
by-products of different land uses. 297 It is arguable, however, that 
the Court's strict requirements for such regulation will adversely affect land use planning. 
[d. at 3163-64. Stevens proposed instead that traditional takings analysis be continued in 
order to afford more guidance and stability to the decisionmaking of land use planners. See 
id. 
287 [d. at 3164 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
288 See id. at 3151-52. Justice Blackmun echoed this sentiment in his dissenting opinion: 
"The close nexus between benefits and burdens that the Court now imposes on permit 
conditions creates an anomaly in the ordinance requirement that a state's exercise of its police 
power be no more than rationally based." [d. at 3162-63. 
289 [d. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
290 [d. at 3162. 
291 [d. at 3154. 
292 See id. 
293 See id. at 3155. 
294 See id. at 3149-50; see also supra notes 279-85 and accompanying text. 
295 See Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3155 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
296 See Merrill, Takings Clause Re-Emerges, But No Clear Pattern Seen, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 
17, 1987, at S-9, col. 2. 
297 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
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primitive standards, when compared to the more justifiable precision 
standards, do not advance legitimate state interests as "substan-
tially" as precision standards, because they leave more room for 
reasonable person interpretation.298 Further, the "nexus" between 
primitive standards and protection against offensive and disruptive 
land uses is not as close as that of precision standards. 299 Thus, after 
N ollan, the imposition of primitive standards may be judged to be 
an unconstitutional taking of land. This Comment, however, ad-
vances four reasons why N ollan should not affect the validity of 
primitive performance standards. 
1. N ollan May Be an Aberration 
First, N ollan might not jeopardize the validity of primitive per-
formance standards because the decision may be viewed as an ab-
erration-not well-grounded in legal precedent-and thus may not 
have far-reaching ramifications for land use law. 300 
It is presently unclear to what extent N ollan will affect the right 
of a municipality to regulate land use, as the case has not been fully 
or adequately interpreted.30I Certain commentators have noted that 
Nollan, in conjunction with a case decided two weeks earlier, First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,302 
signifies the start of a trend to cut back on the broad police power 
afforded the states in land use matters.303 In First English, the 
Court held that a newly enacted ordinance that prohibited a church 
from rebuilding its flood-damaged children's camp in a designated 
flood zone amounted to an unconstitutional taking. 304 The church was 
denied "all use of [its] property" and therefore had to be compen-
sated.305 First English indicates that states may have to pay land-
owners for temporary regulatory takings. 306 
298 Cf McDougal, supra note 13, at 270-71 (noting that the more scientifically based a 
performance standard is, the more likely it "reduce[s] the possibility of arbitrary and capricious 
decisionmaking to the lowest possible level"). 
299 Cf id. at 271 (noting that primitive standards, as compared to precision standards, do 
not provide "the ultimate in protection against possible arbitrariness"). 
300 See infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text. 
301 See CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 31. 
302 107 8. Ct. 2378 (1987). 
303 See CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 28. 
304 107 8. Ct. at 2389. 
305 [d. 
300 See Merrill, supra note 296, at 8-8, col. 1. The holding in First English that there had 
been a taking is not universally accepted. See id. at 8-9 n.12. It is possible that "the Court 
either could have ruled that there was no taking as a matter of law, or it could have required 
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Other commentators, however, view the cases as not having a 
significant impact because they do not state any novel legal princi-
ples.307 These cases are also viewed as aberrations because it is rare 
for the often conservative Supreme Court to make any "revolution-
ary" shifts in land use ideology.308 Further, the shift is novel because 
for over a half of a century the Court had delegated land use regu-
lation to state and local governments.309 Local planners reason that 
if the two cases stand for anything new, it is that local governments 
will be "require[d] ... to state their demands on developers more 
clearly and directly. "310 In addition, because the two cases originated 
in California, a state with a reputation for being quite deferential to 
land use regulation, the decision could be interpreted as requiring 
California courts to adopt a less deferential attitude toward land use 
regulations.3ll If this interpretation of N ollan is correct, then N ol-
lan's impact may be blunted and thus will arguably not affect the 
validity of primitive performance standards, which courts have his-
torically upheld as a valid land use control. 
Nevertheless, there are some indications that the Supreme Court 
is ushering in a more conservative era in land use regulation. 312 
Before the Nollan decision, the Court had not struck down a land 
use regulation since 1928.313 From 1979 to 1986, developers sought 
to have the Court review Agins v. Tiburon,314 in which the California 
Supreme Court held that a regulatory taking could not exist because 
the proper relief for such a claim is amendment or invalidation of 
the land use regulation.315 Although the Court reviewed four cases 
discussing that issue, it did not decide any case on the merits. 316 The 
the church to amend its complaint and develop a better record in support of its taking claim 
before ruling on the remedial issue." Id. 
307 Cf. CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 28 (language of First English "doesn't make 
takings any easier to prove," and after Nollan, public agencies still have "wide latitude ... 
to impose conditions on development permits"). According to Stanford Law Professor Robert 
C. Ellickson, '''For developers to have real power, they need to have a decision in the U.S. 
Supreme Court or the state Supreme Court that say overly strict land use regulations are a 
taking . . . . And that has not occurred. '" I d. 
308 See id. 
309 See Callies, Takings Clause-Take Three, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 48. 
310 CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 28. 
311 See id. 
312 See id. 
313 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
314 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), afI'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 
255 (1980); see also CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 29. 
315 24 Cal. 3d at 272-73, 598 P.2d at 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. 
316 See Merrill, supra note 296, at S-8, col. 1. The cases, in chronological order, are Agins 
v. Tiburon, 444 U.S. 255 (1980) (affirmed California Supreme Court's judgment that proper 
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Court then reached the merits in First English. 317 Although the 
holding was somewhat muddied,318 a clear rule emerged: when land-
owners are deprived, even temporarily, of all use of their property, 
a court may find that a regulatory taking has occurred. 319 
This allegedly conservative approach to land use regulation cul-
minated in the N ollan decision two weeks later.320 Although the 
N ollan decision may have been novel,321 as pointed out by the dis-
senters,322 some commentators suggest that it may not mean that 
the decision was incorrect. 323 The decision can be read as a response 
to local land use regulations that have placed increasingly demanding 
conditions on developers and that are more tangentially related to 
their proposed projects.324 This practice has been ongoing since the 
1970s as local governments tried to preserve areas that were sen-
sitive to development and simultaneously required developers to 
absorb the social costs of development. 325 Thus, in sum, if N ollan is 
viewed as an aberration, or a narrowly decided case, then the long-
standing validity of primitive performance standards will probably 
not be jeopardized. 
If, however, N ollan is not an aberration, but instead embodies 
the Court's new attitude toward land use regulation, then primitive 
standards could constitute a regulatory taking because they do not 
meet the Court's "nexus" threshold to the extent that precision 
standards do. 326 Even if such a judicial trend has been initiated, 
relief for regulatory takings claim is invalidation of the ordinance and not award of damages 
for inverse condemnation); San Diego Gas & Elec. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) 
(Court left question of whether damages could be awarded for regulatory taking unanswered 
because of lack of jurisdiction); Williamson County Regulatory Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (Court remanded case 
for further proceedings and again did not address whether damages may be awarded for 
regulatory takings); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (same). 
317 See Merrill, supra note 296, at S-8, col. l. 
318 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
319 See CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 29. A regulatory taking is a non-trespassory 
invasion of land that occurs when a governmental land use regulation becomes excessive and 
interferes substantially with all use and enjoyment of the property. See CALLIES & FREILICH, 
supra note 9, at 429 (discussing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871». 
320 See Merrill, supra note 296, at S-9, cols. 1-2. 
321 See supra notes 307-09 and accompanying text. 
322 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150-64 (Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). 
323 See Merrill, supra note 296, at S-9, col. 2. 
324Id. 
325 See CALIFORNIA LAWYER, supra note 1, at 28. 
326 See supra notes 297-99 and accompanying text. It is likely that a Nollan test should 
apply to performance standards. Although Nollan's facts concerned a permit condition, the 
decision was written broadly with references to general "land use regulation." See 107 S. Ct. 
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there are nevertheless three other reasons why the holding of N ollan 
should not affect the validity of primitive performance standards. 
2. The N ollan Court Gave Tacit Approval to Primitive 
Performance Standards 
Primitive performance standards should not constitute a taking 
even under N ollan because such standards arguably fall within N ol-
lan's permissible land use regulations. The implementation of per-
formance standards has been challenged as an unconstitutional tak-
ing because it substantially reduces the property value of a claimant's 
land. 327 Given that the imposition of performance standards could 
limit the types or extent of possible development on a vacant tract 
of land, a buyer would probably pay much less for land restricted 
by the standards than for land absent such restrictions. 328 
This takings argument has been used to test the validity of zoning 
in general and has not been successful. 329 Zoning has been approved, 
in the landmark case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,330 as a land use 
device that rationally deals with urban ills so as to be considered 
neither arbitrary nor unreasonable,331 despite the fact that it may 
have some imperfections. 332 The separation of residential, commer-
cial, and industrial use districts promotes safety, the integrity of 
residential neighborhoods, open spaces, and efficient utilization of 
at 3146. Commentators also support this interpretation of Nollan's breadth. See, e.g., Callies, 
Property Rights and the Fifth Amendment: Regulatory Takings and the Right to Compen-
sation, URB., STATE, AND LOCAL L. NEWSLETTER 26 (1987) [hereinafter NEWSLETTER] 
(Nollan has application to "impact fees, dedications, exactions, and other conditions on land 
development.") (emphasis added). 
327 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 268. 
328 See id. at 268 n.3 (noting an example of such a situation). 
329 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (unsuccessful takings claim made against 
zoning on the grounds that zoning reduced the value of land by limiting its potential uses); 
see also Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475 (1934) (upheld city's refusal 
of permit to erect gas station in residential zone); City of Jackson v. McPherson, 162 Miss. 
164, 138 So. 604 (1932) (same); State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 
(1923) (upheld ordinance forbidding business establishment in a designated residence district); 
State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. 451 (1923) (upheld zoning ordinance 
that prohibited the enlarging of an existing business building in a residential zone). 
330 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
331 See id. at 394. 
332 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 269 ("[E]ven if the findings [by experts concerning the 
desirable results to be achieved by zoning] did not sufficiently reflect the wisdom and sound 
policy of zoning, they were sufficiently cogent to prevent a finding that the ordinance was 
clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. "). 
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urban land. 333 An increasingly urbanized society demands more or-
ganized are official land use regulation. 334 
The Nollan Court did not upset this long-standing principle, and 
in dicta stated that zoning in general meets its strict nexus require-
ment for police power actions. 335 Following this reasoning, perfor-
mance standards, even primitive standards, cannot constitute a tak-
ing. The government's objective for using performance standards, 
both primitive and precision, is more substantiated than that for 
general zoning, because such standards are inherently more specif-
ically tailored to protect the public welfare.336 Performance stan-
dards, then, have even less room for arbitrary administrative imple-
mentation than a general zoning ordinance. 337 
Further, Euclid, which received Nollan's approval, left open the 
possibility that more stringent restrictions on land use than general 
zoning ordinances would be implemented in the future. 338 The stage 
was then set for the adoption of both primitive and precision stan-
dards. 339 Thus, it is logical to infer that because N ollan excludes 
Euclidean zoning from being an unconstitutional taking, it similarly 
excludes both primitive and precision standards because they are 
better substantiated than general zoning regulations. 34o The N ollan 
333272 U.S. at 394-95. 
334 I d. at 386. 
Until recent years urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase 
and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are de-
veloping which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect 
of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. 
Id. at 386-87. 
335 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 (1987) ("[AJ broad range of 
governmental purposes and regulations satisfies [the Court's more stringent land use regu-
lationJ requirements .... Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (residential zoning) 
.... ") (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
336 See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. 
337 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 269 ("Surely, an alternative [to Euclidean zoningJ to 
ensure greater protection from the undesirable by-products of uses of land . . . cannot be 
deemed clearly arbitrary and unreasonable under [a takings testJ."). 
338 See supra note 334. 
339 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 269. 
340 Moreover, given that Nollan involved an actual physical intrusion onto beachfront prop-
erty, the case for performance standards is strengthened because their imposition does not 
entail such an invasion. Physical invasions are viewed more harshly by the Court than are 
regulatory takings. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 
(1982) (forced installation of CATV equipment in apartment building constituted a taking). 
Given, however, the uncertain status of regulatory takings after First English, 107 S. Ct. 
2378 (1987), the validity of this argument must await further judicial interpretation; see also 
supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
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Court gave its approval, albeit tacit approval, to primitive perfor-
mance standards. 
3. Primitive Performance Standards Satisfy Nallan's New Takings 
Standard 
Another reason to uphold primitive standards is that, even if 
N allan's new takings standard were interpreted to apply to primi-
tive standards, primitive standards nevertheless meet that stan-
dard. 341 Although N allan merely requires that land use regulations 
substantially advance land use objectives,342 the opinion states di-
rectly that a broad range of governmental objectives-scenic zoning, 
landmark preservation, and residential zoning-and their corre-
sponding ordinances satisfy this requirement. 343 Regardless of 
whether a standard is primitive or precision, the governmental ob-
jective is the same: to protect neighboring land from potentially 
offensive land uses. 344 These standards should enjoy the same status 
as scenic zoning, landmark preservation, and residential zoning. 345 
Not every performance standard, though, can be a truly scientific 
standard. As one commentator has noted, the number of perfor-
mance standards that could actually comply with both scientific tests 
would be so few in number that performance standards would prob-
ably no longer be a viable environmental protection device. 346 
Many primitive standards can at most only substantially advance 
their purported state objective with less than precise scientific 
data. 347 These primitive standards could either become more precise 
in time as technological knowledge expands, or are already now as 
341 See infra notes 342-59 and accompanying text. 
342 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987). 
343 [d. at 3147. 
344 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
345 See supra notes 336-40 and accompanying text. 
346 McDougal, supra note 13, at 270. 
347 See ZONING REFORMS, supra note 32, at 5. In practice, many performance zones regu-
lating adverse effects of land use such as air pollution, noise, glare, or traffic "cannot translate 
their standards into strict numerical measures and it is up to the zoning administrators to 
determine whether a particular [zoning] proposal conforms or not." [d. (emphasis added); cf. 
McDougal, supra note 13, at 270 (noting that the majority of performance standards cannot 
contain "both a scientifically valid means of measurement and a scientifically known and 
acceptable level of performance"). 
Furthermore, performance standards can never be truly precise vis-it-vis a parcel's ability 
to handle development-its "carrying capacity"-because the carrying capacity level for each 
parcel "depend[s] on the design skills employed by the developer, on investments in amelio-
rative features, and on particular characteristics of the site of proposed use type." Fredland, 
supra note 36, at 682. 
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"precise" as they will ever be. 348 Keeping in mind that primitive 
standards are a great improvement over often arbitrary or imprac-
ticable use lists,349 experts agree that primitive standards are "'nei-
ther simple to prepare nor easy to administer' but 'simply do a better 
job. "'350 
Because N allan does not speak in terms of an exact match, but 
merely in terms of a substantial advancement and nexus, it "would 
not seem to require precise criteria when [such criteria are] impos-
sible or impracticable. "351 Even though primitive standards appear 
less substantiated than precision standards, they still do not "utterly 
fail," as did the permit conditions in Nallan,352 to further the local 
government's objective of protecting against harmful by-products of 
land use. Primitive standards are merely less precise because a more 
34" See ZONING REFORMS, supra note 32, at 5; see also McDougal, supra note 13, at 270 
n.63 (standards such as those for odor can probably never be truly scientifically quantified, 
given the level of subjectivity involved in determining offensive levels of odor). 
Furthermore, the American Planning Association, in its Proposed Model Performance Zon-
ing Ordinance, utilizes primitive standards. See L. KENDIG, supra note 177, at 114. Section 
3307 of the Proposed Ordinance, "Heavy Industrial District," recognizes that primitive stan-
dards are inherently necessary in performance zoning: "[Tlhe standards for this district are 
designed to accommodate very intensive industrial uses having severe nuisances which either 
cannot be handled by technology or which are nearly impossible to police." [d. (emphasis 
added). 
349 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
350 Gillespie, supra note 12, at 764 (citing Salzenstein & McCrone, Performance Standards: 
Zoning Air Pollution, 5 INDUS. WASTES 47, 48 (June 1960)). Even the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), which develops most current precision standards or serves as a 
model for jurisdictions that develop their own, allows for the coexistence of primitive and 
precision standards. See EPA Looks at Mandatory Treatment versus MCLs as Way to Control 
Lead Levels in Drinking Water, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 9-10 (May 1, 1987). Even though it 
would rather use "formal numerical values," the agency acknowledged that the less precise 
treatment requirement would be "'easier to write and easier to live with'" because even the 
precision standards are not totally reliable in furthering the EPA's objective of reducing water 
pollution levels. See id. See also Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA, 822 
F.2d 104, 110 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency used a less precise performance standard even though 
a precision standard for the same purpose existed). The NRDC court stated that "[wlhenever 
a technology-based effluent limitation is insufficient to make a particular body of water fit for 
the uses for which it is needed, the EPA is to devise a water-quality based limitation that 
will be sufficient to the task. " [d. 
Further, the Planning Advisory Service, an organization which advises local planners, 
recommended to local administrators that in adopting environmental performance standards, 
they merely needed "specific and measurable" performance levels, not purely scientific ones. 
See INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 2. The Planning Advisory Service 
mentioned, though, that the more precise the standards are, the less administrative problems 
are likely to occur. See id. 
:151 McDougal, supra note 13, at 273; see also Gillespie, supra note 12, at 757 ("The thrust 
of this wealth of scientific data would seem to be to compel communities to adopt precise 
standards where a basis for doing so exists. ") (emphasis added). 
352 See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987). 
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scientific standard either does not exist or is not administratively 
feasible. 353 Primitive standards thus advance the government's ob-
jective as effectively as is currently possible. 354 
Moreover, even the validity of precision standards is questionable 
under Nallan. It is difficult to determine exactly what constitutes 
"scientific" standards because although the word "scientific" is de-
fined as "exact science," it may also be defined as "systematic meth-
ods approximating those of scientists," among other definitions. 355 
Further, because of the subjective nature of human tolerance of 
various offensive by-products ofland uses (odors, for example), often 
no objective standard exists to help establish a level of performance 
for that by-product. 356 Thus, even with so-called "precision" stan-
dards, there is room for arbitrary implementation because great 
latitude remains for judicial construction in favor of performance 
standards. 357 It would be incongruous under N allan to invalidate 
only primitive standards for not "substantially advancing" the gov-
ernment's land use goals when precision standards may also be 
subject to the same criticism. 
Assuming primitive performance standards are desirable, one can 
ensure their validity under N allan by reading N allan to require the 
inclusion of scientific measurement only if it exists and is adminis-
tratively feasible. 358 If precise scientific measurement is not possible, 
then courts should defer to the municipality's expertise in enacting 
the ordinance, provided that adequate planning, studies, details, and 
353 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 272-73. 
354 See, e.g., INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, s'upra note 14, at 97, 103 (discusses 
example of erosion performance standards that are not quite precise but are nonetheless 
acceptable) . 
355 McDougal, supra note 13, at 270 n.63. 
356 See id. 
357 Id. 
358 See NEWSLETTER, supra note 326, at 26. Although Nollan is read as imposing stricter 
standards on government land use regulations, it nevertheless "give[s] its collective blessing 
to impact fees, dedications, exactions, and other conditions of land use." I d. (emphasis added). 
These regulations and others, such as primitive and precision standards, will probably be 
upheld under Nollan as long as they "substantially advance" state land use objectives. See 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147-48 (1987). The permit condition 
in Nollan "utterly fail[ed]" to further the governmental objective not only because it was 
merely tangentially related to the objective, hut because there were less disruptive alterna-
tives to the condition imposed. See id. at 3148. 
In order to further the goal of providing "psychological access" to public beaches, the 
Commission could have imposed height or width limitations on the house, barred fences, 
forbade any construction on the house, or required the Nollans to place a designated viewing 
spot on their property for those beachgoers whose view they had obstructed. See id. at 3147-
48. Primitive performance standards, on the other hand, have no less disruptive alternatives. 
See supra note 348 and accompanying text. Thus, as long as primitive standards are adequately 
substantiated they should survive Nollan. See infra note 359 and accompanying text. 
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explanatory reasons are given for its adoption, and it includes ade-
quate procedural due process safeguards and provisions for updat-
ing.359 Thus, primitive performance standards should be valid even 
under Nollan's new takings test because they substantially advance 
governments' land use objectives as best as is currently possible. 
4. Proliferation of Primitive Performance Standards 
An additional reason to uphold primitive standards if N ollan is 
not deemed an aberration is their widespread acceptance and adop-
tion. 360 Major cities such as Chicago, New York, and Baltimore have 
large-scale performance standards for industrial zones, most of which 
are expressed in precise terms. 361 Other cities such as Boston, Co-
lumbus, Denver and Phoenix utilize a combination of precision and 
primitive standards. 362 Less elaborate, and therefore more primitive, 
standards exist in smaller suburban cities and counties. 363 Due to 
the widespread use of primitive standards, it would be administra-
tively difficult to remove all such ordinances from the books. Towns 
would be left with no suitable replacement if more precise standards 
were not feasible. 364 Even though administrative and monitoring 
problems exist,365 cities have shown their satisfaction with the valid-
ity of primitive standards, including those that coexist with more 
substantiated precision standards. 366 This is a practical reason why 
Nollan should not be interpreted as invalidating primitive standards. 
C. Primitive Performance Standards and Overlay Zones After 
Nollan 
An ideal combination to preserve environmentally sensitive lands 
would be the use of an overlay zone, with its ability to be tailored 
359 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 273-74. This Comment does not argue for the validity 
under Nollan of those non-precise standards which are not even valid under pre-Nollan 
standards. See supra notes 224-41 and accompanying text. 
360 See 4 WILLIAMS, supra note 207, at 420-22 nn.1O-16 (noting that both primitive and 
precision standards are used nationwide). 
361 See id. 
362 See id. at 421 n.ll. 
363 See id. at 421-22, nn.15, 16. 
364 See McDougal, supra note 13, at 270. 
365 See WILLIAMS, supra note 207, at 419-20 (general discussion of the problems of admin-
istering performance standards); see also Gillespie, supra note 12, at 757-64; McDougal, supra 
note 13, at 274-81. But see INFORMATION REPORT Nos. 307, 308, supra note 14, at 5 
(discussing the relative ease of administering performance standards). This Comment focuses 
on the facial validity of performance standards. Discussion of the scholarly debates regarding 
their implementation and administration, and the intricacies thereof, are beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
366 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
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to fit closely over the often irregular shape of such lands, and the 
use of performance standards-both primitive and precision stan-
dards-to ensure that potentially offensive by-products from partic-
ular land uses will not reach environmentally harmful levels. Such a 
zone is proposed for Chesapeake Bay, Maryland,367 and similar zones 
already exist in the New Jersey Pinelands,368 Sanibel Island, Flor-
ida,369 and the coastal zones of Rhode Island. 370 
If, after N ollan, primitive standards are invalidated, then com-
munities could only utilize overlay zones containing precision stan-
dards. This would penalize those communities that are not capable, 
for whatever reason, of administering more precise standards. These 
367 See CHESAPEAKE BAY OVERVIEW, supra note 117, at 2-7. The Chesapeake Bay Critical 
Area Commission developed criteria to preserve the environmental integrity of Chesapeake 
Bay. [d. It requires local governments in the critical area to develop their own land use 
programs that are consistent with this criteria. [d. at 1-1. Prince George's County, Maryland, 
chose to meet this requirement by creating three county-wide overlay zones: the Intense 
Development, the Limited Development, and the Resource Conservation Zones. [d. at 2-7. 
The zones will utilize precision as well as primitive performance standards. See id. at 3-13 
(examples of precision standards); see also PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., PROPOSED CON-
SERVATION MANUAL FOR THE CHESAPEAKE BAY CRITICAL AREA 5-1 (May 15,1987) (examples 
of primitive standards). 
36H See Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18-1 to -21 (West Supp. 1984-85). 
New Jersey created this overlay zone to preserve a one-million-acre ecosystem of pine forests, 
aquifers, and cranberry bogs. [d. at § 13:18-2. Although the zone's administration was headed 
by a state commission, local governments within the zone would be re-empowered to zone 
after they adopted a master environmental plan consistent with that of the commission. See 
id. at § 13:18-16. The zone utilizes both primitive and precision standards. See N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE, tit. 7, §§ 7:50-5:14 to -5:33 (1987) (examples of primitive standards); see also id. § 7:50-
6:85 (example of precision standard). A revised Pinelands Protection Act has replaced the 
original Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:A-I-49 (West Supp. 1988). 
369 See Palmer, supra note 4, at 52. Sanibel Island engaged in a detailed scientific study of 
the ecology of the island and classified the entire island into four ecological zones that served 
as overlay zones on the existing zones. See CALLIES & FREILICH, supra note 9, at 878-79. 
The island's ecological plan also included future growth and impact considerations. See Palmer, 
supra note 4, at 52. 
370 See STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, COASTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (amended 
June 28, 1983) [hereinafter CRMP] (provides an effective, coherent, and unified overlay zone 
program for the management of the state's coastal resources that can be implemented through 
existing authorities and agencies); THE NARROW RIVER: SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN 
(adopted Dec. 8, 1986) (overlay zone management program detailing specific strategies to 
preserve integrity of the Narrow River and its surrounding ecosystem); RHODE ISLAND'S 
SALT POND REGION: A SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN (adopted November 27, 1984) 
(overlay zone management plan to protect sensitive salt ponds from the effects of develop-
ment); PROVIDENCE HARBOR: A SPECIAL AREA MANAGEMENT PLAN (adopted November 22, 
1983) (overlay zone management program to control water pollution in the harbor). 
Although land use regulation in these overlay zones are governed by the Rhode Island 
Coastal Management Council, a state agency, the Council "[c]onsult[s] and coordinat[es] with 
local . .. and private interests." CRMP, supra, at 16 (emphasis supplied). The zones utilize 
a combination of use-lists and performance standards. See'id. at 23, 67, 88. 
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communities would be affected even though they are able to enforce 
less than scientific standards, the validity of which is backed by 
adequate studies, forethought, and planning. Communities utilizing 
such zones would be rendered less effective in protecting environ-
mentally sensitive lands, because the zones could only utilize an 
inefficient aspect of Euclidean zoning-zoning by lists. 371 
The only real victim of such a N allan interpretation and subse-
quent invalidation of primitive performance standards would be the 
environment, which would not enjoy the benefit of the protection of 
rationally computed yet not scientifically precise performance stan-
dards. As long as primitive standards work, and there are no current 
viable alternatives, it is best to leave them in place. As Justice 
Brennan pointed out in his dissent in N allan, in light of the complex 
reality of natural resource protection, a court should not substitute 
its own narrow judgment for the land use expertise of state and 
municipal agencies. 372 Thus, even after N allan, environmentally sen-
sitive lands should have the benefit of overlay zones with the best 
performance standards possible, whether they be primitive or pre-
cision based. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Overlay zoning compensates for the shortcomings of most other 
land use controls in protecting the environment from harmful land 
uses. It allows municipalities, sometimes with the guidance of state 
or county governments, to specifically tailor a land use without 
disturbing the underlying zoning. In addition, overlay zoning works 
especially well due to its utilization of performance standards, which 
enable a municipality to set limits on the offensive by-products of 
various land uses. 
Performance standards, though, cannot always be scientifically 
detailed. Sometimes they will be primitive standards-expressed in 
terms of nuisance law or computed through the use of legitimate, 
yet not truly scientific, studies. As long as they are not arbitrarily 
enacted or enforced, and advance the government's environmental 
objectives as effectively as currently possible, there is no logical nor 
convincing reason for the Supreme Court's "edict" in Nallan to serve 
as a wholesale invalidation of primitive standards. This would be too 
high an environmental price to pay. 
371 See supra note 181 and accontpanying text. 
372 NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3162 (1987)(Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
